EU Turns

This reads well:

Imagine what modern Europe would look like now if Poland had the political status of Georgia, lying in some sort of political-moral twilight zone with former Soviet interests linked to the KGB having a far freer time to penetrate into that society and play games with Polish assets.

As does this:

As if the EU's ambiguous response to the Georgia crisis was not depressing enough, life is getting tougher on the economic side too in Europe:

The eurozone as a whole shrank by 0.2pc, the first contraction since the launch of the single currency a decade ago. Germany led the slide with a fall of 0.5pc. France and Italy fell 0.3pc. The delayed effects of the strong euro, tight credit, and slowing exports have now kicked in with a vengeance.

Problems for my own British-based budget as we sit in muggy Orlando:

The pound could soon dive to barely more than a dollar and a half while gold prices plunge to $650, experts predicted yesterday amid fresh evidence that the commodity boom is ending and the dollar's resurgence is under way.

But whereas the UK can hope to use its currency as a set of buffers, the Eurozone faces much more searching internal strains:

... the euro is nothing like the dollar. It has no European government, tax, or social security system to back it up. Each member country is sovereign, each fiercely proud, answering to its own ancient rythms.

It lacks the mechanism of "fiscal transfers" to switch money to depressed regions. The Babel of languages keeps workers pinned down in their own country. The escape valve of labour mobility is half-blocked. We are about to find out whether EMU really has the levels of political solidarity of a nation, the kind that holds America's currency union together through storms.

My guess is that political protest will mark the next phase of this drama. Almost half a million people have lost their jobs in Spain alone over the last year. At some point, the feeling of national impotence in the face of monetary rule from Frankfurt will erupt into popular fury. The ECB will swallow its pride and opt for a weak euro policy, or face its own destruction.

Gulp. 

The commentaries on Georgia pour out.

This one by John Bolton is sharp and good. Try this:

The European Union took the lead in diplomacy, with results approaching Neville Chamberlain’s moment in the spotlight at Munich: a ceasefire that failed to mention Georgia’s territorial integrity, and that all but gave Russia permission to continue its military operations as a “peacekeeping” force anywhere in Georgia. More troubling, over the long term, was that the EU saw its task as being mediator – its favourite role in the world – between Georgia and Russia, rather than an advocate for the victim of aggression.

And this:

The West, collectively, failed in this crisis. Georgia wasted its dime making that famous 3am telephone call to the White House, the one Hillary Clinton referred to in a campaign ad questioning Barack Obama’s fitness for the Presidency.

The point being:

 ... we are facing the much larger issue of how Russia plans to behave in international affairs for decades to come. Whether Mikhail Saakashvili “provoked” the Russians on August 8, or September 8, or whenever, this rape was well-planned and clearly coming, given Georgia’s manifest unwillingness to be “Finlandized” – the Cold War term for effectively losing your foreign-policy independence.

Hence:

 ... we should have a foreign-minister-level meeting of Nato to reverse the spring capitulation at Bucharest, and to decide that Georgia and Ukraine will be Nato’s next members. By drawing the line clearly, we are not provoking Russia, but doing just the opposite: letting them know that aggressive behaviour will result in costs that they will not want to bear, thus stabilising a critical seam between Russia and the West.

 ... Russia did not invade Georgia with diplomats or roubles, but with tanks. This is a security threat, and the proper forum for discussing security threats on the border of a Nato member – yes, Europe, this means Turkey – is Nato.

Saying this may cause angst in Europe’s capitals, but now is the time to find out if Nato can withstand a potential renewed confrontation with Moscow, or whether Europe will cause Nato to wilt. Far better to discover this sooner rather than later, when the stakes may be considerably higher.

What is interesting about Issues is that they do not go away even when we do not want to look at them.

'Europe' (in this case the EU) finds some things Just Too Difficult.

One example. Which countries are in Europe? This simple question is highly unsimple and (worse) uncomfortable, since to answer it clearly opens the prospect of EU membership to those countries who qualify.

Those EU members who (a) do not want much further enlargement and (b) see the EU above all as some sort of balance to the USA do not want to think about bringing any more of the former Soviet republics into the European fold. To do so opens questions about Russia's role which (they think) are best left unopened.

Alas for them the Russian intervention in Georgia does open that question.

So, EU. Are we going to stand nervously inside our fence listening to the cries for help of people looking remarkably like Europeans hammering at the gate as they get savaged by bears?

A noteworthy sub-plot in the Kosovo situation is a plan by Serbia to ask the UN General Assembly to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an Advisory Opinion.

Serbia looks to be getting some handy noises of support for this manoeuvre from eg Russia and India.

And some Western voices are urging Serbia not to proceed.

See eg French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner. And HM Ambassador in Belgrade Stephen Wordsworth. Wordsworth calls the Serbia initiative a mistake and a 'challenge to the EU', although he does note that not all EU member states themselves have recognised Kosovo's independence.

(Translation Note: in Serbian 'Wordsworth' comes out as 'Vordsvort', something like a distant cousin of Voldemort. But I am pretty sure they are not in fact related.)

Back at Pristina University in Kosovo, Professor Enver Hasani is not too worried by Serbia's ICJ idea:

... the goal of Serbia will not be achieved because the creation or destruction of states is a factual matter, not legal ... the initiative of Serbia could falter at the General Assembly of the UN since the odds are good for more recognition to be added to the list by then. But even if Serbia succeeds in getting the decision it wants, that decision could only have moral power and does not oblige anybody ...

These international legal tussles at the ICJ drag on interminably, but they are important symbolically and substantively.

There must be plenty of countries out there who find the Kosovo independence problem a real quandary, and who will be quite pleased if (a) nothing happens to force them to take a view one way or the other for years to come, and (b) the ICJ eventually pronounces for one side or the other (albeit on an Advisory Opinion basis) so they have the option to follow that lead in good conscience.

Plus if Serbia can get the Kosovo problem passed to the ICJ, it buys time and defuses the problem in Serbia's domestic politics for a few years.

A handy outcome for Serbia. Not so good for Kosovo?

John Redwood aims to correct in brisk fashion some 'Continental Misunderstandings' about a future Conservative Government's policy on further EU integration (and indeed the EU integration we already have).

Eg on the Lisbon Treaty:

“We assume the Conservatives will go along with the European project and with the Lisbon settlement – the UK has always in the past joined in, albeit reluctantly and late.”

It would be unwise to make such an assumption this time. When Margaret Thatcher came to power she did want to complete the Single market, and when Tony Blair came to power he did want to give the EU more powers over social and employment policy. The modern Conservatives have no wish to grant any more power to the EU. Moreover, we have voted against Nice, Amsterdam and Lisbon because we disagree fundamentally with them, and expect powers back. As William Hague has said, we cannot leave matters as they are if Lisbon has been ratified by all countries.

“What can the UK do if Lisbon has not been ratified by all countries?”

An incoming government can keep its pledge to give the people a referendum. If they vote No to Lisbon the government will repeal the legislation and the Treaty is dead.

A UK referendum of this sort would be a cracker of an event. Some Continentals must be wondering nervously what happens if the Irish problem remains 'open' and the Labour Party's agonies here prompt an early UK election.

Otherwise the key point is the proposition that if Lisbon has been ratified (somehow) by the time the Conservatives take over (if they do), "matters cannot be left as they are".

Fine. But what exactly to do?

There is always the famous Lisbon Treaty Article 50 which for the first time makes explicit the option of a member state actually leaving the EU, even if the last word zanily looks to be left with the European Council once the European Parliament has given its 'consent':

1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.

2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.

Heading into that maelstrom is maybe too dramatic a UK move, for the time being.

But as there is no prospect of our EU partners agreeing to 're-open' the Treaty to row back some of it for the UK's benefit, what else is available?

The next best lever for Change We Brits Can Believe In is ... British Money. Not agreeing to pay it into the central pot without radical reforms.

That means the next Financial Perspective negotiations which come round again in 2012 or thereabouts.

180 weeks or so.

Not too long.

The FT attempts to describe how this morass of trade rules complexity has hit the rocks (Note: deliberate mixed metaphor). See also this.

When one has worked in Diplomacy for as long as I have, one realises just how little one knows.

So on this subject I have primitive instincts/prejudices in favour of 'free trade' as opposed to eg 'fair trade'. But if asked to write a succinct and sensible two-page essay on how world trade talks work, I could not do so.

Obviously some of it is about what actually happens, and some of it is about what might happen, and how different 'safety nets' can be used in case of things going 'wrong' (NB not easily defined what that means) on a local level.

Plus a lot depends on the individual power of specific national and international lobbies, with US elections and no doubt many others round the world looming.

And predicting what any deal will mean in practice with oil and food prices in such a state of flux round the world is next to impossible

Thus from the FT:

The US created some momentum last Tuesday by proposing to reduce its allowable ceiling for farm subsidies to $15bn (€9.6bn, £7.5bn). The figure was a couple of billion dollars below Washington’s previous offer and much less than existing limits of $48bn, though – as Brazil and India promptly pointed out – about twice its current actual spending.

It appears from this that the US slashed its farm subsidy safety net in this area from a potential $48bn to a measly $15bn. Pretty generous, huh? But Brazil/India pointed out that in fact the US was spending only some $7bn, so keeping the safety net at double that was suspicious.

See also this:

The US, with covering fire from some developing world agricultural exporters such as Uruguay, insisted that India and China open their rice and cotton markets; India and China, backed by other heavy hitters such as Indonesia, said that the US was asking them to sacrifice too much.

It does not sound from this as if the USA is going to be noisily blamed for this trade round failing. China and India as fast developing economies want to have their rice cakes and eat them - they want maximum freedom to export and maximum options to protect their domestic base. Nothing surprising there, but other developing countries might think that with the success they currently are enjoying they might take a few more 'risks'.

It is all horribly complicated. Business Standard:

The battle to conclude negotiations for Doha in agriculture and market-opening for industrial products broke down due to unbridgeable differences between India and the United States over the trigger and remedy for using the Special Safeguards Mechanism (SSM) by developing countries to check sudden surges in imports of vulnerable farm products.

After 12 days of intense negotiations, Commerce Minister Kamal Nath and his US counterpart US Trade Representative Susan Schwab failed to agree on a figure for using the SSM.

India proposed that if imports cross 115 per cent over a base period, it should be allowed to impose safeguard duties that are 25 to 30 per cent over its bound duties on products taking zero cut.

Uuurgh. How far in all that are they talking about things likely to happen in real life, as opposed to mere potentially destabilising possibilities? How many special interests stand to benefit corruptly round the world from the jungle of local rules needed to make such detailed provisions work?

Finally, the human factor. These articles bring out that the personalities of individual negotiators count for a lot, as does the guile or otherwise of the person leading the process, here WTO DG Pascal Lamy. He gambled that he could close some well known large gaps, and (says the FT) lost.

What next?

All being well that the main players will go off and lick their wounds for a few months without rocking the global trade boat too much in the meantime.

Then try again.

And hope that in the meantime those who lose out from rather less globalisation (ie the very poor) don't perish on a scale and in a way which allows anyone involved in these talks to be blamed.

Craig Murray has commented on my earlier post about EU policy towards Uzbekistan:

You make the somewhat childish debating error of asserting that because I have said that US republicans do something, I am claiming that only US republicans do that thing.  I have in fact published numerous pieces, both on my blog and elsewhere, attacking Germany's policy in Uzbekistan. Not sure if this link will show, but this one entitled "Uzbekistan and German Disgrace" is just one example: http://www.craigmurray.org.uk/archives/2007/05/uzbekistan_and.html

Well, childishly or unwisely or otherwise I was basing myself on p.37 of his book, which singles out 'conservative politicians in the USA' and 'short-sighted US Republicans' for confusing Uzbekistan leader Karimov with true democrats elsewhere in the former communist world.

Later on p.60 is a fullish description of the mighty 'K2' US airbase in Uzbekistan which is mentioned elsewhere in the book at different points. But it takes us until p.330 to discover that our benign EU partner Germans too have a significant military airbase in Uzbekistan.

And it takes us until p.378 tucked away in Note 73(!) to find out the name of "the most frequent and obsequious" Western Minister to visit Uzbekistan, namely "Joschka Fischer, the trendy Green German Foreign Minister". 

Craig likes to express his views in a blunt, provocative way. See eg his recent remarkable two-for-the-price-of-one sexist swipe on his website aimed at the Labour candidate who lost in the Glasgow East byelection:

... the graceless vituperation of the defeated New Labour candidate, the shrew-faced bitch Margaret Curran ...

It is fair to take his book about Western policy in Uzbekistan as his considered view on that subject. And that book hits far harder at US/UK perfidy than at eg German perfidy. Hence my childish simplification.

Maybe a book dwelling in greater length and in a balanced way on contradictions in EU as well as US policy towards Uzbekistan would have been more accurate, subtle - and persuasive? And for all those reasons less likely to sell?

Next. On to analyse Chapter Four of Craig's book, where he meets President Karimov and the German and US Ambassadors...

Peter Preston gives a rather overwritten analysis of Serbia and its prospects for joining the EU - see eg the obscure Paul Anka reference.

Why, he asks, is the EU mumbling about bringing the former Yugoslavia space (plus Albania) into its ranks?

Partly because the EU mumbles about everything.

Partly because countries like France plan to hold EU Widening hostage to get more EU Deepening (but on French terms, bien sur)

Also because there must be a school of thought out there that the former Yugoslavia should have joined nicely in the 1990s and had one vote - is this all an insane plot by the Balkanites to get themselves six or seven votes?

The arrest of Karadzic prompts another thought.

What if Tadic's Serbia has had a Clever Idea? To hand over all those war criminals, dash for EU standards and join the EU as a polite, penitent, respectable modern country. Even now Serbia is probably better run than some new EU member states one can think of. 

Serbia will believe with good reason there is no prospect of Kosovo joining the EU at that speed - its insititutional base is too weak.

And the point is this.

Once Serbia joins the EU it will be able to Define Terms for Kosovo, just as tiny Cyprus defines terms for Turkey.

Discuss.

This story shows what is wrong with 'EU Foreign Policy'.

As previously posted, in dealing with difficult problems a thematic, sustained and firm approach can bring positive results. Especially if it is thematic, sustained and firm.

In this case the EU responds reasonably firmly to terrible killings by the Uzbekistan authorities in May 2005. But then is neither thematic or sustained.

Craig Murray would have us believe that it is 'short-sighted US Republicans' who turn the biggest blind eye to Uzbekistan abuses, because the USA has a huge airbase there.

Yet lo, it turns out that Germany has a goodly airbase there too, and in a generous gesture of humanitarianism issued a visa to the cancerous Uzbekistan Minister responsible for the massacre to help him be kept alive in a German hospital. Germany is said to be leading the push to drop EU measures.

Good news: US troops can use the German base now, the offending US base having been closed in 2005 after the short-sghted Republican Bush team spoke out against the Uzbeks' massacre.

So EU pressure on Uzbekistan looks to be dwindling a mere 170 weeks after the massacre, although various restrictions remain in place.

Why?

Basically because it is all Just Too Difficult.

The key argument in favour of an 'EU Foreign Policy' we hear in the UK is that it acts as a multiplier for British positions.

What tends not to be mentioned is that it acts as a multiplier for other EU Member States'positions too, not least when they disagree with us.

Result?

Junk Diplomacy. 

EU Referendum do a number on a judgement by the European Court of Justice which sets a precedent

for thousands of other couples residing in Ireland and, more widely [and] better defines the rights of EU states to manage their own immigration policies.

Under the EU directive on free movement of citizens, all citizens may reside in another member state as workers or students if they have sickness insurance and sufficient funds that they do not become a burden on the social welfare system.

Family members of a citizen of the European Union also have the right to move and reside in the member states with that citizen.

The ECJ ruled today that application of the directive is "not conditional on their having previously resided in a member state".

"The directive applies to all union citizens who move to or reside in a member state other than that of which they are a national, and to their family members who accompany them or join them in that member state. The definition of family members in the directive does not distinguish according to whether or not they have already resided lawfully in another member state," the ruling stated.

The court also held that a "non-community" spouse of an EU citizen who accompanies or joins that citizen in the host country can benefit from the directive "irrespective of when and where their marriage took place and of how that spouse entered the host member state".

EU Referendum:

So, what we have here is an open door for illegal immigrants. As long as they can get themselves over here – or to any other member state - and evade the authorities long enough to find themselves wives who are EU citizens (who themselves may have been recent immigrants, as was Metock's spouse), EU law gives them an absolute right to stay here or anywhere else in the EU.

Whatver happened to Ex turpi causa non oritur actio ?

One version is here.

Some speeches are good for what they say. Others for how they make people feel.

This speech said more or less nothing, but reads nicely now and no doubt sounded good on the day. Or maybe not?

This paragraph caught my eye:

This is the moment when every nation in Europe must have the chance to choose its own tomorrow free from the shadows of yesterday. In this century, we need a strong European Union that deepens the security and prosperity of this continent, while extending a hand abroad. In this century - in this city of all cities - we must reject the Cold War mind-set of the past, and resolve to work with Russia when we can, to stand up for our values when we must, and to seek a partnership that extends across this entire continent.

Hmm: every nation in Europe must have the chance to choose its own tomorrow free from the shadows of yesterday.

Feeble drafting. But what might it mean?

Some sort of dig at Russia, telling it to stop messing in the former Soviet Union? A plug for Chechnya?

A clarion-call to those who want to leave the EU, so that those who stay in it can forge a stronger/closer Union?

Support for the break-up of the UK (or Belgium, or Spain, or Bosnia)?

Even Bland Nothing sends a signal of sorts.

Round at the Bruges Group last night to hear a thought-provoking Very Big Picture talk.

The argument went like this:

• not too long ago when Communism ended in Europe there were books about the triumph of democracy, the 'end of history' and so on
• now the emphasis is on Islamic fundamentalism. This is a physical danger but less obviously an ideological danger - Al Qaeda-ism is in bad human and intellectual shape (not a model for anyone) and the Iraq Surge is succeeding, with positive ripples elsewhere
• however, we also now we see Russia reappearing and China emerging, both with obvious and unabashed authoritarian instincts
• one advantage they seem to possess is a Confident Identity, and a sort of legitimacy with their own people flowing from that (Note: quite how true is that, I wonder?)
• so a global ideological clash is back with us, between Democracy and Authoritarianism (Note: indeed - see that recent UNSC Zimbabwe vote)
• in this the EU has a unique but not necessarily benevolent role as a sort of 'post-democratic society', an area where power and decision-making are seeping from electable/accountable people to non-elected and non-accountable people (Brussels institutions, European Court)
• some in the USA do not mind this and quite like the idea of a Strong Europe, since otherwise Europeans (even the Brits) add very little 'extra' these days
• "the EU likes to lecture potential new member states on democracy, but the EU is so undemocratic that it could not join itself" - see eg the open bullying of Ireland quickly to have another referendum and this time get the Right Answer
• if Obama wins there will be those who try to push the USA in a more 'European' direction, but strong democratic instincts/arrangements will stop that going too far ...

Hmm.

There is a serious question here as to where the EU stands on Democracy. The EU Project lumbers on, Liberal but not Democratic, knowing that key aspects of the project were put to referenda they would be rejected and not just in the UK.

Here in the UK the Labour Party promised us all a referendum, then broke the promise and ratified the Lisbon Treaty. The Conservatives would not have done this, but look unwilling to force the deeper issue wide open if they come to power. 

On the other hand, the fact that Poland and the likes of Estonia are now in the EU means that a much sterner EU eye has to be kept on Russian post-Soviet pronouncements and power-building.

In short, the Bruges Group speaker was right.

We are back into a global Grand Battle of Ideas.

The current British problem is that with the Labour Government in such a demoralised position and the economy wobbling, we now have nothing especially coherent to say - or much credibility when we mumble it. 

My earlier posting on Craig Murray's telegram to the FCO recording serious human rights abuses in Uzbekistan dismissed the response he won from HQ, namely that the UK would press for an 'EU demarche'.

Why? It sounds grand and important.

Not an easy question to answer simply.

What is a 'demarche'? In this context a formal representation of protest/concern agreed and issued by the EU member states as a whole, and delivered on behalf of the EU to a host government by a small group of Ambassadors.

Who they are depends on who is around. Thus it might be that the country representing the EU Presidency has no bilateral Embassy in the country in question, so another Ambassador will be representing the Presidency locally and take the lead. S/he might be accompanied by the Ambassador representing the country taking over the forthcoming Presidency and eg an official from the Commission.

I never liked being part of these 'group' demarches and (bad boy) turned a Nelsonian Blind Eye to any instructions to do so. It always struck me as arrogant and patronising - and therefore likely to be less effective - that a group of Ambassadors appear to gang up on a host governmentto to deliver a formal protest.  Much better to attack the target in coordinated parallel bilateral sessions, with each Embassy delivering the message in the way most calculated to have Impact.

Plus, to be frank, I never liked airing my dark diplomatic arts in front of other non-British colleagues. What if during the meeting a private hint emerged of a way of moving forward which needed some frank discussion? Harder to do that in an EU group without straying from 'instructions' or risking exposing EU divisions and risking a silly row. 

EU demarches are therefore true 'lowest common denominator' diplomacy.

In this case the UK probably will have put round a telegram called a COREU to all EU member states' Foreign Ministries summarising the Murray report, and proposing the text of a demarche.

There then may well have followed a painful round of Euro-teeth-sucking and drafting quibbling, of the form:

"The Foreign Ministry of Moronia thanks the UK for its draft Demarche on this undoubtedly important subject, but wonders whether more investigation of the case in question is needed before the European Union commits itself to the proposed course of action...Given the lack of clarity about the facts of this one case, perhaps the language in paragraph 6(b) needs to be rather less direct? May we propose instead ..." 

Because consensus is needed, the draft in successive rounds of wittering tends to get diluted to suit the weediest concerns.

And, of course, if by any chance the foreign Minister of Moronia is meeting the Uzbekistan Minister in the coming weeks, Moronia may well not choose to open a row beforehand by sending in its Ambassador for a demarche of this sort.

Bottom Line: slow, bad outcomes. No real impact expected.

As Craig reports later in the book, the French Ambassador delivered the eventual demarche accompanied by Craig and two other EU colleagues "in a tour de force of Gallic insouciance", giving every impression that the exercise was purely formal and of little substance. When Craig then pointed out that in Uzbekistan 99% of trials ended in conviction and so were probably not fair, the Uzbek Foreign Minister smirked "Under our system only the guilty are accused."

In other words, this way of doing diplomatic business did not strengthen the weight of the protest, as the EU liked to think. It obviously diminished it.

What's more, the process of lurching the EU machine into movement for hollow exercises of this nature is time-consuming and distracting.

Which, worst of all, creates in the FCO official mind a sort of pre-emptive dumbed-down British punch-pulling - "if we can not get the support of EU partners without a lot of hard work or at all, why bother?"

Is there any better way to proceed?

Alas not obviously in this case. The Uzbeks were too far away, too obnoxious and too impervious to normal diplomatic pressure. Engaging our efforts with the Americans rather than the EU might have been better. But as we shall see, Craig quickly fell out with the US Ambassador and whatever chances there might of been of using that approach dwindled away.

Why not press for a personal letter to be sent from our Foreign Minister to his.her Uzbek oppo, to express in frank terms strong British dismay at this example of Uzbek injustice?

But here too one is Nutted by Reality. A private letter makes more impact on the target Minister, but because it is private it is easier to ignore. Publishing the letter turns up the public rhetorical pressure but allows the target and local media to dismiss the whole protest as tired/toothless/'arrogant' British post-imperial nagging.

And in the Uzbek system the Foreign Minister is probably a suave front-man with no power anyway. Even if he too is revolted by the Uzbek courts, what in practice can he do? Does he want to risk his nice job and perks for the sake of someone he has never met and who he suspects (rightly) of wanting to bring about radical changes including the ejection from office and possible trial of himself?

Er ... no.

When all the diplomatic flim-flam is stripped away, it all boils down to some very fundamental propositions:

• Can we persuade them to behave better on Human Rights merits?
• If not, can we plus/minus others create a different cost/benefit calculation for them to mull over - either more Gain or more Pain, or combination thereof?
• And is the effort required to make a difference in Hell-Hole (A) really worth it? Better to throw our available Human Rights time and energy at places such as Hell-Holes (B) and (C) which for one reason or the other currently look more receptive and where we have more levers to pull?

Tough, huh?

Welcome to Diplomacy.

Moving on to the substance of Craig Murray's book.

Chapter One opens with a description of Craig leaving the Embassy in Samarkand (seemingly early in his posting) to attend a dissident trial.

...out I went, still feeling pretty uncomfortable at people calling me 'Sir'...

Part of Craig's self-presentation lies in in portraying himself as Mr Unconventional Unstuffy Ambassador, eschewing boring old protocol in favour of Action. This sits uneasily with other passages in the book where he expresses indignation at the poor treatment handed out to him as Ambassador by the Uzbeks:

... I had accepted an invitation to a dinner to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the state tractor factory. (Note: they know how to throw a party in Uzkebistan) All the Ambassadors were invited but I was the only own to turn up apart from the Belgian Honorary Consul. We were completely ignored and left to find our own place at the bottom of the table. I learnt that the rudeness shown to diplomats at Independence Day was typical...

Invited to a concert at Tashkent Conservatoire:

I was the only Ambassador to turn up. There was nothing prepared for me, and I was left to find a place in a concert hall that was overfull.

Had Craig's office telephoned to confirm and nail down satisfactory protocol arrangements? What I would have asked to be done, if only because then one is on firmer grounds to complain afterwards if there is a mess.

Craig meets relatives of some of the unlucky people on trial, including the beautiful Dilobar:

Her brother was going to be executed and I was trying to make out her legs through her dress. I was filled with self-loathing.

Not for long:

My momentary self-hatred turned to real anger against a system that promotes torture and execution, as well as against fellow diplomats for their complacent acquiescence.

After having 'snapped' against a paramilitary who held him back, grabbing him by the throat(!?) and raging "Don't you touch me!", Craig enters the shabby courtroom.

A superb description by Craig of the seedy, immoral farce which ensues, operating under the communist principle that 'the prisoner in the dock has to be guilty, otherwise why would he be in the dock?'

The nasty judge makes no pretence at honesty and justice, summarily and obnoxiously dismissing all defence witness points including claims of torture. Very bad.

Craig leaves, rightly (seems to me) shaken by this experience. He resolves:

... to dedicate every fibre of my being to stopping this horror in Uzbekistan ... I would not go along with lies or leave the truth unspoken ... If these were our allies in the War on Terror, we were not on the clear moral ground which Blair and Bush (sic) claimed so boastfully.

The grim episode is reported to London, with the result that it is agreed that the UK call for an EU demarche by way of formal protest.

Craig does not comment on this useless outcome. If anything is less likely to make an impact in a place like Uzbekistan it is an EU demarche. Why did he and the Human Rights team in London go for this banal approach?

Was there really nothing else in our diplomatic armoury which might have had a sharper, deeper impact? A Ministerial letter? Instructions to weigh in with the Uzbeks at a high level? Balance of taking action privately as opposed to publicly? How to engage the Americans? Consideration by Craig on how best to Make an Impact, both immediately and over the time of his posting?

Not explained, one way or the other. A pity.

Craig does fairly analyse the difficulty even with plausible sounding dissidents of getting to the bottom of what was going on and why. There were rebel groups of different varieties out there working hard and maybe even violently against the Uzbek regime. Maybe some of those on trial had been involved in illegal activities, even if their trials were manifestly unjust? Not easy for diplomats to decide how best to proceed. Well put.

The chapter ends with Craig seeing unspeakable photgraphs of a dead Islamic dissident - subsequent analysis indicates that he had been killed by immersion in boiling water after earlier torture.

Professional Judgement Rating: 8/10. Powerful and unprecedented first-hand senior intervention at one of these trials in Uzbekistan, reported speedily to London. Not clear why the London/Post operational outcome looks so weak. Signs of excessive and inappropriate confrontation/frustration with the locals, plus an intemperate attitude to colleagues: diplomats who disagree with him are not necessarily 'complacent'.

Every now and again one sees an interview of such vigour, insight and directness that one wants to shake the hand of the speaker, even if one does not agree with everything said.

Ladies and Gentlemen, meet Major General Raul Cunha, Chief Military Liaison Officer of UNMIK, giving his views on the success and failures of EU engagement in Kosovo:

The situation here is not brilliant and we are a lot to blame. We, I mean the western international community. We have maybe invested here in the worst way and we were not very careful with the money. Each time I take a look at the numbers, I notice that 80% of the investment was made on consultancy and capacity building and, practically speaking, we didn’t build any capacities.

That money was very badly spent. Maybe if we would have invested that same money to build a proper power plant, schools and good universities we could have guaranteed a productive structure.

That pillar of reconstruction and economic development inside UNMIK was always a responsibility of the European Union and we can verify now that there is no productive structure in Kosovo.

After all, what has the famous pillar of the EU inside UNMIK done throughout all these years except to denationalize some companies and to put them in the hands of some persons who may not be very recommendable? Nothing!

European Union has spent in Kosovo 4 000 million euros, in different ways. From those 4 000 millions, 80% was spent in capacity building and consultancy, which means that 3200 millions went back to the base...

Or try this:

Mr. Solana is still saying that we are creating stability in the Balkans. I am not going to argue over the fact of Kosovo being independent, but the way this process was conducted goes in the direction of instability, and not stability.

Because when we say this is a unique case which doesn’t represent a precedent, we know we are either lying or being hypocrites.

It’s clear that no two cases are equal. It’s clear that each of them is unique, but all of them have one thing in common: the will of one group to separate from another to create their own motherland. This is the same for everybody.

The trouble with me (it is said) is that I reduce everything to first principles.

Yes. But are they not refreshing?

In a neat example of government 'spin' in action, David Miliband's speech today about Europe is being trailed in this morning's Guardian.

Once upon a time it was a good enough result to get the speech reported after it had happened. That being unreliable, Labour have taken to a high art the reporting of a speech before it happens.

By giving one or other outlet an 'exclusive' to some of the pre-speech substance they secure positive coverage largely on the government's own terms and, if all goes well, they may get further coverage after the speech takes place.

Two headlines for the price of one!

It of course takes a servile and idle media environment to pull this one off, time after time. But we have one, so that's OK.

The likely speech? Miliband will praise the French for saying they are willing to reintegrate into Nato's command structure, and will insist that a stronger European defence policy does not mean Nato stops being the cornerstone of European defence.

But he will add: "As the Balkans wars in the 1990s demonstrated, unless Europe can develop its own capabilities, it will be consigned always to wait impotently until the US and Nato are ready and able to intervene.

Huh? The Balkans wars in the 1990s demonstrated no such thing. The best available European capabilities (ie British and French) were deployed in large and flexible numbers. It was the political dithering in Washington and other capitals including ours that created so many problems. 

In any case, ever since PM Blair and President Chirac launched European Defence back in 1998, the deep problem has been that Europe wants to avoid paying for it.

Even better, pay even less. And so the gap between collective EU defence spending and US spending grows and grows.

So instead of dwelling on that failure of their own leadership and looking hard at Priorities, EU leaders prefer to fiddle with the structures.

More structure = less flexibility. By creating more 'European' defence we effectively give a greater say over our possible deployments to all those countries who contribute very little but have huge opinions on everything.

Will we hear one day an honest speech from a Foreign Secretary looking at substance not spin and saying something about that?

President Kaczynski of Poland says that 'for now' he will not sign the EU's Lisbon Treaty.

The BBC report describes Kaczynski as "a conservative who has long opposed the reform treaty". But what about this? "I really want ratification."

One way or the other, President Kaczynski is good at saying exactly what he thinks, so unless the Irish come round to accepting the Treaty of their own free will there is no chance of Poland signing it.

Plus, unlike (I suspect) almost every politician in Europe talking at great length about the Treaty, President Kaczynski will have read it with great care, identifying exactly what he likes and what he does not like.

As a lawyer himself with a beady eye for detail, he is comfortable in the view that if the EU's own rules say that an EU Treaty has to be approved by every country, one country has the right to say No and block the Treaty. Which ends the matter.

Anything else (he argues) means that the rules on paper are not the rules in practice, which means that the EU Strong tend to fix the game. And after the experience of the past century, that is just the sort of thing which Poland has good reason not to want.

Plenty of Poland's politicians will now make a big noise saying that in taking this position Kaczynski is not being 'European', while quietly being quite pleased that if the Treaty founders Poland keeps the (for Poland) terrific Nice voting formula all the longer.

President Sarkozy takes over the EU Presidency today:

"Something isn't right. Something isn't right at all ... Europe worries people and, worse than that, I find, little by little our fellow citizens are asking themselves if, after all, the national level isn't better equipped to protect them than the European level."

Sarkozy called such thinking a "step backward".

Would Kaczynski argue that sticking to the rules is in fact the first step forward?

Serving as HM Ambassador in Belgrade from 2001-2003 I had the task of advising London on how best to handle the aspirations of demands in Montenegro for independence from Serbia.

At the time European capitals were just getting over the NATO bombing campaign aimed at ending Milosevic's appalling rule over Kosovo. So further Balkanization of the Balkans did not seem like a good idea, especially when opinion in Montenegro itself was pretty evenly divided.

Then Foreign Secretary Robin Cook took the view that such issues should not be decided on a wafer-thin minority. He also thought, looking at the Bosnia disaster, that it made no sense to support Montenegrin independence if the largest single 'ethnic' community in Montenegro (ie Serbs) were opposed to it.

Plus opinion had moved against Montenegro's ambitious leader Milo Djukanovic. He had brushed aside personal appeals from US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright that he take part in the 2000 elections in the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to help bring Milosevic down. I stood in the FCO main courtyard listening to her in Washington remonstrate with him in Podgorica via the cell-phone of a US diplomat listening in on the animated conversation.

Djukanovic miscalculated. He thought that as Milosevic was bound to win by hook or by crook he would stand vindicated by boycotting the phoney election.

But Milosevic crashed. Leaving Djukanovic with the problem of remaining credible in Western eyes while standing aloof of FRY processes.

Djukanovic had his eye set on independence for Montenegro. He put his head down and decided not to cooperate on Western terms.

This did not work out as he hoped. He eventually in 2002 was compelled to agree to a new loose formation called 'Serbia and Montenegro', seen at the time as a major success for 'EU Foreign Policy'.

But nothing really worked properly in SAM. The Montengrins stalled, playing for time. Serbia's post-Djindjic leadership were unable to project any coherent policy, torn between fear of being seen as 'interfering' and unable to do much to help Montenegro's Serbs or to appeal to non-Serb Montenegrins.

My name during my posting in Belgrade was of course mud in Montenegro pro-independence circles, as I loyally pursued HMG's and EU/US policy of working to keep Serbia and Montenegro together.

All manner of banal communistic tricks were used against me when I visited Podgorica. Blatant telephone and conversation tapping. Grotesque personal attacks against me in the official and non-official pro-Djukanovic media.

I reported one especially lively piece to London in July 2002 in a telegram entitled 'Slimed!'. In it I recorded that I had been publicly denounced in Podgorica as a tool of MI5 and MI6, a Serbian nationalist with a love of "oriental cuisine, grilled meat, monasteryism and Smederevo wine". The article said that had Montenegro already achieved independence, I would have been PNG'd: "Note: as good an argument for independence as I have seen".

Anyway, I left Belgrade in mid-2003. The EU policy I was instructed to pursue steadily lost its way. The Patten (ie monied) part of the EU's external effort did not throw its weight wholeheartedly behind the Solana achievement. So much for European foreign policy

And lo, in 2006 Montenegro finally achieved its independence.

If Montenegro is now independent of Serbia it is not obviously independent of Russia, which has hit upon the happy idea of just buying goodly chunks of it.

Life goes on.

There I was in a Brussels restaurant last week when in walks Milo Djukanovic with a sizeable pack of Balkan security types, little plastic curly things sprouting from all available ears.

We greeted each other warmly. I congratulated him on Montenegro's independence and we exchanged visiting cards.

As ever, I praise fine technique.

Djukanovic knew what he wanted. And he got it.

A text-book example of a tiny, highly focused and sustained ambition defeating far larger but uncertain and disorganised opponents.

Montenegro has not followed the line of most EU countries and recognised its neighbour Kosovo as an independent state.

Why not?

Because doing so is "not high on its list of priorities":

Everyone understands our positive distanced and considered views on Kosovo independence.

Odd, that.

Positive? Hard to say - depends on one's point of view.

Considered? No doubt.

But distanced?

Is not taking a view on the legal status of an adjacent territory about the highest priority in any country's foreign policy?

Why is Montenegro now being so coy, after supporting Kosovo's aspirations to escape Belgrade rule to help its own plans for independence?

It has an Albanian minority of its own to think about. And it has a lot of Russian money and influence sloshing about its coastline.

A lot.

Those Russians with Moscow's support might think that the Montenegrins were being a tad ... ungrateful by moving to recognise Kosovo?

So down the Podgorica priority list that one goes.

Watch, and be astounded.

Various MEPs all of a sudden become shy of the media - when they are filmed at 0700 hrs, apparently improperly claiming their daily expenses...

Which reminded me of George Harrison's classic, Beware of Darkness:

Watch out now, take care
Beware of greedy leaders
They take you where you should not go...

Back from Brussels, hearing lots of theories about whether the Lisbon Treaty is dead, alive or in some sort of suspended animation.

The core options appear to be these:

• brutalise/bribe the Irish into submitting mainly via various 'Declarations' aimed at meeting most of their identifiable concerns, allowing a further and this time successful Yes referendum in Ireland next year. Ideal outcome for Europhiles, but High Risk.
• let the Treaty die and soldier on as now. Embarrassing, but Low Risk. Some (France) will try to use this to block enlargement across the board. Germany may support shutting the door but only if Croatia is let in quickly. Others (Poles, Czechs, UK) likely to be deeply unimpressed with such cynicism - and what does the EU do with the non-EU Balkan Black Hole within its own geographical space? Madness to say that those 20 million people can not join a Union of 500 million?
• try to bring in via cherry-picking those parts of the Treaty which can be effected without a full-blown new Treaty. Unglamorous and Unedifying, seen as Undemocratic, Lowish Risk

France faces the unenviable task of trying to pick a way forward through its coming Presidency on the basis of some sort of reasonable consensus.

To be continued. 

This is a sharp account of one serious Russian view on Russian energy issues:

Mr Chubais has spent the past 10 years masterminding the break-up of UES, the Russian electricity monopoly, which will cease to exist next week after selling off its generators in the biggest liberalisation of Vladimir Putin’s presidency. His insistence that Europe is misreading Gazprom is striking as he is a frequent critic of the gas monopoly.

He warned Europe’s actions were part of a broader international tendency in oil and gas towards increasing state intervention and closing domestic markets – which he warned were a “dead end” and posed big risks “for the world and for Russia”. A return to protectionism was “madness”.

He's right of course in that. But Europe's problem is that these energy issues are not symmetrical.

Russia has energy on a vast scale. Europe does not.

In Europe the use of major energy contracts as a political policy tool is ruled out. That is not obviously the case in Russia.

So, battle is joined. How does Europe import Russian energy on a huge scale while exporting greater transparency/due process back up the supply chain into Russia? Does Russia use its energy predominance craftily to export its political worldview as well?

See eg the reluctance in many parts of the EU (not only ultra-cautious Poland) to allow Russian interests to buy key energy assets, for fear that those assets will not be managed in a purely commercial way for purely commercial purposes.

Not surprising, given the way Russia under current management weighs in to rewrite former contracts and grab better terms when it feels like it.

But Mr Chubais has a point here:

Mr Chubais insisted ending subsidised gas supplies to former Soviet states was about “stopping handing out money for free”. “Why the hell should we supply gas to Ukraine” for discount prices, he asked. “And meanwhile, forgive me, these scoundrels are stealing gas…

I wrote about this problem back in 1996 while at the Embassy in Moscow. I said that the West hypocritically nagged post-communist Russia to behave in a market way, but then complained about Russian 'bullying' when Russia pressed eg Ukraine and Serbia to move towards paying market-prices for energy and stop 'diverting' gas supplies improperly.

That said, for a long time it suited Russia to leave other former Soviet republics and parts of the Balkans hooked on cheap energy as a way of keeping them within the Russian 'sphere of influence'.

Maybe we are finally emerging from that period to a tougher game, based on world prices with 'influence' won or lost via different means?

Should one support one's own country at international sporting fixtures? If so, why?

Take the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Bosnian Muslims (Bosniacs) and Bosnian Croats have been busy rioting again following the defeat of Croatia by Turkey in the Euro 2008 football match. The Bosniacs supported Turkey, the Croats Croatia.

Republika Srpska PM Dodik deftly stirred this pot, coming out for Croatia:

The issue on the match Turkey-Croatia and possible skirmishes in Mostar have nothing to do with football. But ok, great sport competitions become an occasion for the irreconcilable differences of Mostar to come up.

Meanwhile when Serbia plays Bosnia, Bosnian Serbs root for Serbia.

Serbs of course titter at all this and say that it just goes to show that loyalties can not be created by international fiat. Until they start spluttering with rage at the wickedness and ingratitude of Kosovo's Albanians for not supporting their native republic of Serbia.

Back in the UK, theologians ponder whether it is sinful for Scots to support England's sporting opponents. (Answer: it depends.)

And what of Lord Tebbit's famous 'cricket test' as a way to measure loyalty? This Guardian headline asserts that it has been 'hit for six' because so many 'black and Asian people' (sic) now see themselves as British, but oddly the article does not mention which cricket team they support when England is playing India/Pakistan/West Indies.

Supporting any given English football team has long ceased to be a rational exercise. Once upon a time at least some of the players were locally born, so there could be a local fan base urging them on. Now so many of the players now come from overseas, so on one level there is no obvious loyalty issue at all other than to the club brand.

But in international fixtures an English or Scottish or British team do somehow represent 'us'.

And if there is no 'us' as in the Bosnian case, where does that leave Bosnia? Can any country survive without some minimal mutual self-identification across its citizens as a whole?

The very names we use make a difference:

Of course our own very nomenclature reinforces one or other stereotype in such cases. Thus from the start of the Bosnia drama (as still now) we have talked about the 'Bosnian Serbs' and 'Bosnian Croats' - not the 'Serbian/Croatian Bosnians'. Somehow the ultimate identity emphasis is put by us - as indeed by them - on their Serbness or Croatness, not their Bosnian-ness.

This of course suits those who say that there can never be a meaningful shared non-ethnic Bosnian identity anyway, hence the whole Bosnia and Herzegovina project as supported by the US/EU is doomed to fail.

But that failure can drag on for a long time in the form of surly stalemate, propped up expensively by EU taxpayers as the alternative is too ghastly to contemplate.

Also known as Belgium.

This FT article is scary reading:

European chief executives believe the Irish No vote in a referendum on the Lisbon treaty is bad for business as it weakens the European Union on the global stage against the Middle East, Russia and Asian countries.

But we can relax. When one reads the article it turns out that the grandly collective description 'European Chief Executives' in fact means 'three European Chief Executives', all with Germanic names. Does the FT have editors?

Meanwhile, over at the Economist:

It is time to accept that the Lisbon treaty is dead. The European Union can get along well enough without it.

Do we hear the dull thud as the ex-parrot topples to the bottom of the bird-cage?

France's President Sarkozy warns that without the Lisbon Treaty there can be no more EU enlargement.

A magnificent example of the mysterious mirror-world of EU negotiating.

France of course does not want any more EU enlargement, especially if it includes Turkey. See eg lots of Parliamentary haggling in France over a proposal to make Turkey's eventual EU accession subject to a referendum.

So now France proclaims the logic of enlargement in a perverse attempt to assert the moral/political 'pro-European' high ground: noisily championing enlargement while in fact planning on enlargement not happening except maybe for Croatia (now close) and then the other small Balkan states in due course.

So what does France as led by Sarkozy really want?

Probably on balance it wants the Lisbon Treaty to come into effect. Not so much because it deeply cares for the Treaty as such, but because it will be pretty embarrassing for the forthcoming French EU Presidency if a serious mess unfolds.

Plus France wants as little as possible EU enlargement, as France's punching weight edges down as the EU gets bigger.

Yet Good Technique always must be commended. In this case clarity of expression combined with clarity of purpose.

President Sarkozy:

"Without the Treaty of Lisbon there won't be any enlargement," he said. "You can't say no to reforms and yes to enlargement." 

Oh that the British Government had said in the 2005 Budget negotiation:

"Without major reform of the EU Budget there will be no more money from the UK. You can't say yes to more British money and no to reform."

And meant it.

Should the EU's atom-sized sanctions on Cuba be lifted?

Why not? They do not matter, as they are a Silly Noise unattached to a policy.

The debate of course is not about whether these sanctions make a difference, symbolic or otherwise. It rather is about whether the EU should have a clear policy on regime change in Cuba.

The EU has no such policy. It does not call unambiguously for free and fair elections in Cuba, or do anything active and purposeful to support the pro-democracy forces there help secure a better future for their country.

Whereas the USA does.

Why does anyone think that an EU Foreign Minister as supported by an EU External Action Service will do anything other than give even more weight and respectability to collective spinelessness?

It's worse than that. By expecting that EU member states' policies be 'compatible' with collective positions, the aim of EU federalists is to dumb down the effectiveness and capacity of those member states willing to take some risks and commit resources in a situation like this.

The failure of the Labour Government to break free of the Guardianista Castrovian sentimentalists in its ranks and instead join the Czechs and Poles in press hard for democracy in Cuba is one of the first things a new government in London needs to put right on the foreign policy front...

Bring it on.

What does it mean when it is said that the rate of inflation in Eurozone country X is greater than in countries Y and Z? Nothing?

The fact that prices are going up is not in itself inflationary. The market expects or even in fact is prices going up and down. That's what prices do, responding to myriad factors.

If house prices are going up in Manchester but down in Cardiff, we do not talk about 'inflation' in Manchester.

Thus if prices rise across the board in eg Italy but not France, that is not 'inflationary' unless the ECB starts printing money and pumping it into Italy to fuel it.

Rather we are seeing an important market signal that various process are under way in Italy which are not happening in France and/or vice versa - and citizens/investors/businesses should act accordingly. For some the rising prices in Italy might make it more attractive. For others not.  

Not a problem. In fact the only way to run things.

Or am I missing something?  

The Polish media are reporting that Polish local government employees dealing with applications for EU funds are quitting their jobs to join the private sector, where pay is much higher.

No surprise. The Polish Development Minister told me a while ago that the greatest problem Poland faced in spending its EU largesse was 'people'.

Poland not surprisingly finds it hard to mobilise and train the army of officials across the country needed to pick their way nimbly through the voluminous EU (and Polish) processes needed to get EU funds sent to (and spent sensibly in) Poland. And indeed we see a tendency for firms pitching for EU contracts to nab anyone in government who is any good at all this, since contracts can be large and anyone who understands both EU and Polish procedure is a highly valuable asset.

So, Poland will battle to spend all the EU funds available to it in the current Budget cycle. The basic sequence goes something like this:

• government agrees overall balance as between central and regional discretion in spending and priority sectors
• national/regional development plans are prepared
• project ideas emerge
• specific tenders are drawn up
• bids come in and are examined against financial/environmental and other criteria
• bidders win (or lose) - maybe rows and appeals break out
• specific contracts are then prepared
• work starts
• and is completed - checks needed that the job has been done properly
• with plenty of paperwork and checks still needed for the Brussels cheques to arrive once the work is nicely completed

Uuurgh.

Huge scope at each stage for delay and muddle, even with good intentions and reasonable people all round.

That said, the fact that Poland has not spent much of its EU funding so far is no surprise - in the nature of the process the big spending comes at the end of the Budget period (ie in a few years' time) once all those steps have been completed.

Or is all this money in fact a resource curse anyway? Funding which is so hard to access that it skews national efforts in an unhealthy direction?

Is Kosovo moving towards 'functional partition' (or more likely dysfunctional partition)?

The nub of the international problem in Kosovo is that on the one hand the EU/US claim to rule out on principle partition on 'ethnic' lines, while on the other they claim that the independence of Kosovo is not in fact such an ethnic partition of Serbia, when obviously it is.

Or is the argument rather that former Yugoslavia should be allowed to break up along the lines demarcated by its internal Titoist borders on some sort of idea of self-determination for the dominant local community?

If so, why not allow Serbia to make a measured case for the claim that (a) the borders of the communist Autonomous Provinces were 'different', and/or (b) that where Kosovo is concerned those borders should be tweaked in the interests of achieving some higher substantive fairness - and a settlement everyone can grudgingly accept?

Whatever one thinks about the myriad rights and wrongs of all this, is a Final Result which appears to give a degree of self-determination to every ethnic community in former Yugoslavia except the largest group (ie Serbs) self-evidently ... wise?  

Let's look a bit more closely at Will Hutton's arguments on the EU Treaty as published yesterday in the Observer.

He denounces 'Eurosceptic' celebrations at the Irish vote as a farrago of lies and disinformation.

OK. Let's proceed. WH v CC.

WH: The reality is that Ireland's 'no' voters have trashed an EU that is precious but weak.

CC:  No. The EU is untrashed, still as precious as ever and impressively strong - has anyone seen the Euro v Dollar rate recently?

WH:  Most 'no' voters, grabbing on to the worst fear rather than reasoned fact, have unknowingly set in train a political dynamic that, unless carefully handled, could lead not just to Ireland but Britain leaving the EU. Everybody will be the poorer.

CC:  Actually the Treaty for the first time establish