How to Negotiate

Michael Binyon deploys chess metaphors to describe Russia' s military push into Georgia:

Vladimir Putin lost several pawns on the chessboard - Kosovo, Iraq, Nato membership for the Baltic states, US renunciation of the ABM treaty, US missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic. But he waited.

The trap was set in Georgia. When President Saakashvili blundered into South Ossetia, sending in an army to shell, kill and maim on a vicious scale (against US advice and his promised word), Russia was waiting ...

... Moscow can also counter Georgian PR, the last weapon left to Tbilisi. Human rights? Look at what Georgia has done in South Ossetia (and also in Abkhazia). National sovereignty? Look at the detachment of Kosovo from Serbia. False pretexts? Look at Ronald Reagan's invasion of Grenada to “rescue” US medical students. Western outrage? Look at the confused cacophony.

There are lessons everywhere. To the former Soviet republics - remember your geography. To Nato - do you still want to incorporate Caucasian vendettas into your alliance? To Tbilisi - do you want to keep a President who brought this on you? To Washington - does Russia's voice still count for nothing? Like it or not, it counts for a lot.

Let's dwell on that chess metaphor a while.

Aron Nimzowitsch was a great chess Grandmaster. One of his famous reputed chess aphorisms is "the threat is stronger than the execution".

The sense is that one can wait for some time to play a strong chess move, letting the threat that it might happen create new advantages. However, once the move is played the threat is gone and the move stands on its own merits. And, of course, the move is 'committal' - once played it can not be taken back.

In this case the Russians have been watching the Kosovo precedent and waiting to move.

One possible move was to stand firm on rejecting Kosovo independence. Another was to say that if Kosovo gets what it wants, why should not some others do the same?

The Georgian episode opens the way for Moscow to play the second move, as looks to be happening: "Georgia's territorial integrity is a dead issue".

However, Russia is a UN Security Council Permanent Member so such moves have to be wrapped in some sort of credible international law ribbon.

By parking on unbending opposition to the Kosovo precedent, Russia claimed to rule out ad hoc exceptions to a key precept of international practice in Europe in recent decades, namely that borders can not be changed without general consent.

What exactly is Russia now saying?

That if a country behaves badly enough towards minority territories, those territories can break away?

That any territory can break away if it has a strong supportive neighbour?

Or is there a new realpolitik doctrine emerging, that a new twilight zone category of small pseudo-states might emerge whose 'independence' is recognised by a core of supporters but not the international community as a whole? See also Transdnistria.

These questions have mind-boggling political and diplomatic ramifications rippling on down the decades to come. What looks like a strong move now may (or may not) come to look like a mistake.

For now Russia has all sorts of operational options in Georgia, using the presence of Russian official and unofficial forces on the ground to play for time and create (as we chess-players say) unfathomable complications.

For a famous example of such complications, see Game 14 of the World Championship match between Garry Kasparov and Vishy Anand. At the height of the battle (and the Championship struggle as a whole) with both players short of time, Kasparov on move 27 made a dramatic speculative knight sacrifice throwing the position wide open. He outplayed his opponent in the ensuing dog-fight.

Putin maybe has in mind a famous American example:

I don’t believe in psychology. I believe in good moves.

Welcome Instapundit readers.

While we Crawfs have been travelling the Georgia story has moved on, to the point where French President Sarkozy has been helping broker some sort of truce and possible peace plan.

No end of commentaries too, of course, many dwelling on what this episode tells us all about Russia's apparently resurgent power and equivalent 'Western weakness.

Here is the mordant Spengler saying that Putin should be the President of the USA, not Russia.

Or try the hopeless divisions in the EU, as described by the Guardian.

This rapier-like analysis by Victor Davis Hanson nails most of the right wider points:

We talk endlessly about “soft” and “hard” power as if humanitarian jawboning, energized by economic incentives or sanctions, is the antithesis to mindless military power. In truth, there is soft power, hard power, and power-power — the latter being the enormous advantages held by energy rich, oil-exporting states. Take away oil and Saudi Arabia would be the world’s rogue state, with its medieval practice of gender apartheid. Take away oil and Ahmadinejad is analogous to a run-of-the-mill central African thug. Take away oil, and Chavez is one of Ronald Reagan’s proverbial tinhorn dictators.

... When one factors in Russian oil and gas reserves, a pipeline through Georgia, the oil dependency of potential critics of Putin, and the cash garnered by oil exports, then we understand once again that power-power is beginning to trump both its hard and soft alternatives.

When the Soviet Union collapsed a new implicit Deal emerged. It had various elements, some more obvious and robust than others:

• the 'West' would not reorganise its economic and security arrangements developed during the Cold War (primarily EU and NATO) to accommodate a totally new situation.
• Russia was invited to cooperate with the 'West' but effectively from an objectively weak position, and therefore on Western terms albeit with significant Russian involvement (see the pretty good Contact Group period in former Yugoslavia)
• but Russia insisted on and somehow retained the idea that its 'near abroad' (ie the former Soviet Union republics) were more Russia's then the West's.
• The three tiny Baltic republics dashed from the Russian camp and formally joined the Western camp, but while the new 'Commonwealth of Independent States' led by Russia was an institutional flop it achieved its main purpose in Moscow's eyes, ie keeping the other new states involved in a Russian psychological space.
• For some years this seemed like a good enough outcome for the West. Involvement in these deeply Sovietised territories was hard work. Russia was arguably the most democratic state in the CIS and looked to be exporting modest pluralism or at least modernisation to them.
• Latterly we have seen two rival tendencies. The CIS states moving to some sort of open market relationships beyond former Soviet borders and therefore opening up to Western processes (and wealth); in short, having different and rather attractive new options. And Russia gaining a windfall of wealth from soaring energy prices while itself adapting to a strategic transformation.
• This gives Moscow impressive new ways to exert influence across the CIS - buying key assets, 'persuading' CIS leaders that cooperation is in their best interests and so on. Why strap these countries down in close and boring neo-imperial ties with Moscow when it is so much easier to buy or control indirectly the best bits?
• That goes only so far. Moscow has to be especially tough with the (few) parts of the CIS which are still making the greatest formal efforts to join the Western camp. Hence intense Russian efforts in Ukraine while keeping CIS frozen conflicts well chilled, to create local imbalance/uncertainty which Moscow can nudge as and when necessary.
• And, now, Moscow pouncing on Georgian miscalculation to up the ante by overt military intervention.
• This Georgia crisis therefore represents the formal end of the original West/Russia Deal, which was already dead in the water as evidenced in part over Balkan policy in general and Kosovo in particular.
• Russia instead is proclaiming a New Arrangement: that if there are to be Westernising processes in the CIS area they will take place on Russia's terms, and that Russia is ready to use force to defend its self-proclaimed interests.
• Russia could press on and topple the Georgian leadership, and maybe still will.
• But the Russian Mind also will relish the idea of leaving Saakashvili twisting forlornly in the wind, humilated both by having failed to recapture South Ossetia and by having been left standing alone as the USA and all Georgia's European friends watched aghast but did significant nothing to help.
• And the likely Russian tighter grip on South Ossetia also creates a handy pseudo-precedent for Serbia gripping the Serb-controlled territories in northern Kosovo.

Will the West sign up to Russia's New Arrangement for the CIS space? If so, what? And if not, what?

More generally, are we moving to a new, darker and unpredictable international situation?

In which Rules will matter less, Willingness to Prevail a lot more?

Does the objective correlation of forces favour those leaders who in a pre-modern way have a clear sense of what they want - and are ready to take risks to achieve it? Leaders who will think they have the upper hand against other leaders who rely on little more than post-modern flannel and uneasy hopes?

"Our peacekeepers and the units attached to them are currently carrying out an operation to force the Georgian side to [agree to] peace".

More on the feisty Report by the HoC Public Affairs Select Committee report which came down heavily on FCO rules purporting to limit what diplomats might say after they leave the Service.

Craig Murray calls these regulations 'near-fascistic':

The idea, of course, is that only the ministers' version of truth will enter history. You can be confident that Jack Straw's memoirs will not tell you that he instructed Richard Dearlove that we would use intelligence from torture, or that we colluded with torture and extraordinary rendition in Uzbekistan and elsewhere. You needed my memoirs for that. If Jack Straw had his way, I would not have been able to publish my book telling you the truth; in fact the new regulations were born directly out of Straw's fury at Murder in Samarkand.

We now have a government so despised that it strives to protect itself further and further from scrutiny...

Let's be a tad more dispassionate.

Back to first principles.

The public want - and expect - to know in some detail what Government is up to with their money. 

The public also want Government to Just Get On With It, weighing complex interests and principles and taking hard decisions intelligently. 

As we are a free country, people should be able to comment on and/or write searching analyses of policy issues once they are out of public service, subject to some sort of reasonable cooling off period.  

That said, the public simultaneously like tittle-tattle and 'revelations', but also do not like seeing former officials trading in the public’s information to make a personal profit. 

These fickle public expectations are not invariably compatible with each other, or with real life. 

Foreign policy in particular requires a different quality of common sense confidentiality.

Domestic issues are in a way all 'ours' - disagreements and negotiations are within the British political family, all of whom claim that they want the best for the country.

Foreign affairs are different. Day in, day out HMG are involved in tough negotiations round the planet with people who may be our enemies, or who rightly want to do the best for their countries by exploiting British weaknesses/mistakes. It is madness to show our detailed analysis and negotiating hand to our rivals for ‘UK freedom of information’ reasons, when they of course will not reciprocate. 

At the very hard end of the spectrum are highly sensitive intelligence reports, sometimes gleaned from foreigners risking their lives to share information and insights with us (which NB does not mean that those reports are accurate/reliable).

The public know that the world can be a dirty place. They broadly trust the government to defend British interests by using such material wisely. This means keeping secrets secret, the public respecting limits on the public's 'right to know'. Lost lap-tops containing secret official material convey a sense of fathomless incompetence.

In return for ceding extra government discretion in this murky area, the public react badly to politicians whipping up public sentiment on the basis of inconclusive intelligence analysis, as happened in the run-up to the Iraq intervention. 

You know when you are seeing something Really Secret when its heading is a Greek letter or acronym you haven't seen before: TOP SECRET UK EYES A EPSILON/LOCKTIGHT or somesuch.

During my career I have seen all sorts of highly confidential analyses of controversial issues and countless Top Secret reports. I have written such papers myself.

Now I have left the FCO. Should I be free to use my privileged access to this fruity material to make money or stir up public anger, even if I happen to think the moral case is just?

In my view, no. Certainly not immediately I leave the Service, and for some purposes never.

The 'system' (and here I part company with Craig Murray) does offer all sorts of democratic best practice ways for officials to register substantive concerns, compatible with maintaining the secret methods needed to track foreign spies working against us, or managing threats posed by ruthless terrorist killers themselves armed with high-tech kit.

Have we got everything Perfect? No.

Room for improvement/tweaking? Probably.

Risky business for politicians and the public alike, one way or the other? Yes.

All that noted, if we agree that I am not to be 'allowed' to use my knowledge of highly sensitive processes/facts as I like immediately on leaving the FCO, how to give effect to that?

And if there are Rules or Principles, how to apply them? What threat should hang over me to deter me, a former British diplomat pecking away at my lonely keyboard, from overstepping the rules, in letter or spirit?

Legal proceedings against potential publishers?  Prison?

Threats to my pension? Ah now you're talking!

Finally, who in the end decides if a line has been overstepped, and what should happen next?

The Public Affairs Committee made a strong point in noting that in Freedom of Information Act disputes a separate outside mechanism has been set up to stop a Ministry being judge and jury where its own information is concerned. Something like that could be used to settle in a gentlemanly way rows over contested memoirs of the Jeremy Greenstock sort?

Ministers! The smart way to lean is towards generosity, creativity and flexibility. Do not appear vindictive/obsessive/defensive.

Few if any 'revelations' by former civil servants do drastic irreparable damage. We are in fact quite loyal for most purposes, most of the time.

Much worse political damage can be done by appearing to cover up and duck the hard questions than by taking some hits, heavy and unfair as they may be at the time.

And, above all Ministers, behave in an honourable, trustworthy and fair-minded way towards your officials and the public alike.

This gives you your best chance of winning their respect and so surviving the inevitable squalls of democratic public life in good shape, maybe even with a reputation enhanced.

Light touch, old boy, light touch – always the safest policy.

... just when Barack wants to make America cool again, people are being really mean to him.

How cowardly is that?!

Via American Digest.

A noteworthy sub-plot in the Kosovo situation is a plan by Serbia to ask the UN General Assembly to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an Advisory Opinion.

Serbia looks to be getting some handy noises of support for this manoeuvre from eg Russia and India.

And some Western voices are urging Serbia not to proceed.

See eg French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner. And HM Ambassador in Belgrade Stephen Wordsworth. Wordsworth calls the Serbia initiative a mistake and a 'challenge to the EU', although he does note that not all EU member states themselves have recognised Kosovo's independence.

(Translation Note: in Serbian 'Wordsworth' comes out as 'Vordsvort', something like a distant cousin of Voldemort. But I am pretty sure they are not in fact related.)

Back at Pristina University in Kosovo, Professor Enver Hasani is not too worried by Serbia's ICJ idea:

... the goal of Serbia will not be achieved because the creation or destruction of states is a factual matter, not legal ... the initiative of Serbia could falter at the General Assembly of the UN since the odds are good for more recognition to be added to the list by then. But even if Serbia succeeds in getting the decision it wants, that decision could only have moral power and does not oblige anybody ...

These international legal tussles at the ICJ drag on interminably, but they are important symbolically and substantively.

There must be plenty of countries out there who find the Kosovo independence problem a real quandary, and who will be quite pleased if (a) nothing happens to force them to take a view one way or the other for years to come, and (b) the ICJ eventually pronounces for one side or the other (albeit on an Advisory Opinion basis) so they have the option to follow that lead in good conscience.

Plus if Serbia can get the Kosovo problem passed to the ICJ, it buys time and defuses the problem in Serbia's domestic politics for a few years.

A handy outcome for Serbia. Not so good for Kosovo?

Pressing on through Craig Murray's Murder in Samarkand, we reach Chapter 4 - Diplomacy.

Craig has to present his credentials to President Karimov to assume the full rights and responsibilities of HM Ambassador. These credentials traditionally are formal letters in flamboyantly old-fashioned courteous language language from HM The Queen to the Head of State concerned, recalling the previous Ambassador and introducing the new one.

A diplomatic curiosity. My Portuguese colleague in Belgrade was proud to display on his wall the top copy of his letter of credentials from the President of Portugal to to President Milosevic - Milosevic had fallen from power between the letter issuing and the ceremony to present it, so the Ambassador kept it!

Craig goes to the high profile ceremony armed (to his surprise - no explanation given for this surprise) with authority from the FCO to say some firm sentences on human rights. He describes well his encounter with President Karimov. 

Karimov is a Tough Egg, briefed to pretend to praise the UK on its long democratic traditions and lament the fact that Uzbekistan had fallen under Russian and not British imperial rule - a version of the usual rubbish line used by Bad Leaders to explain away the absence of basic democratic principles in their territory ("Pity poor us - struggling to catch up with you noble Brits, from so far behind!"). 

Karimov congratulates the UK on recent anti-terrorist legislation allowing suspects to be held without trial. Craig describes this as "a striking illustration of just how much encouragement New Labour's attack on civil rights in the UK gives to dictators round the globe". 

Hmm. Not sure they need any such encouragement - and in any case a fraction of the due process available to prisoners under these British laws would go a long way to improve things in somewhere like Uzbekistan.

Karimov responds to Craig's words on human rights with strong words of his own directed at Islamic militants and Russian influence - Uzbekistan had little choice but to respond in an authoritarian way. Craig admits that this speech makes an impression: "while he might be a thug, he was a complex and shrewd one with a profound grasp of detail."

Craig moves on to meet his EU colleagues.

The German Ambassador says that Uzbekistan offers only the illusion of progress. No mention here of Germany's military airbase and political support for Uzbekistan. But the Germans have offered numerous Uzbeks political asylum.

The French Ambassador warns against rocking the boat - the Americans have the major interest in Uzbekistan.

The Italian Ambassador's office is guarded by "three absolutely gorgeous young women ... white low-buttoned blouses exposing a terrific amount of cleavage, hip-hugging black short skirts with stockings and shiny black high heels".

The Italian Ambassador - with hotty support staff like that, why not? - looks like "someone playing God in an old Jimmy Stewart film"; he accuses the Americans of failing to grasp the complexity of a situation, either at the time or in retrospect.

Craig first encounters his US colleague at a lunch he hosts for a visiting IMF delegation. The US Ambassador (supported by the French Ambassador) inclines to give the Uzbekistan authorities the benefit of the doubt on their so-called economic reform programmes. Awkwardness occurs when Craig as the newcomer albeit with some experts' support argues that Uzbekistan statistics may not mean much, if anything:

The lunch established my reputation for being difficult and outspoken, while convincing me that the US were willing to bend any fact in defence of their ally, Karimov.

The next day Craig has a rather bruising private meeting with the US Ambassador, who does not welcome Craig's concerns about human rights abuses. He argues that Karimov is the best available Uzbekistan leader, grappling with real problems caused by Taliban-style militants: "Extreme Islam is itself a kind of institutionalised violence". He gives an example of one case where his personal intervention helped secure convictions of three policemen for murdering a detainee.

Craig then has something of a row with the Uzbekistan Minister for Economic Affairs, arguing over the facts (or otherwise) of Uzbekistan's reform programmes. He departs concluding (not unreasonably?) that the Minister had been talking 'complete rubbish'. 

After these first briefing rounds and being in post and in the region only some 27 days(!), Craig reaches two far-reaching policy conclusions.

That the USA had got its Central Asian policy thoroughly wrong. And that HMG in turn were wrong to follow the US line:

I knew that as Ambassador it was my duty to inform Jack Straw and Whitehall of my view. But I was also aware that it would be acutely unpopular ... saying what I wanted to say was likely to damage my career pretty severely...".

Craig then drafts a pair of telegrams advising in strong terms that HMG do not support more IMF money for Uzbekistan: Uzbekistan's performance does not merit it, whatever political deal might have been done by the Americans to secure use of Uzbek air facilities. Without real economic reform poverty would get worse, breeding more Islamic fundamentalism:

You do not encourage real reform by applauding fake reform. The poor of Uzbekistan should not become the victims of September 11.

A second telegram weighs even more heavily into the morality of US support for the Karimov regime with its totalitarian controls and use of torture:

If Karimov is on 'our' side, then this war [on terror] cannot be simply between the forces of good and evil. It must be about more complex things, like securing the long-term US military presence in Uzbekistan ... 11 September had also been the anniversary of the overthrow of the democratically elected President Allende of Chile ... we should have moved on from the disastrous policy of US-backed dictatorships.

Craig knows that he was going 'way out on a limb'. His junior colleague Christ Hurst wisely opines that this telegram was "pretty long for a resignation letter".

The telegrams issue. The text of a draft version of the first one is here. It is in fact rather better than Craig's excited description in the book suggests.

A letter appears from Craig's line manager in the FCO, Simon Butt. Craig is 'overfocused on human rights', plus discussing human rights cases on open phone lines likely to be monitored by the Uzbek security services. Craig's performance is causing concern...

So we get closer to the heart of the book.

What is happening here?

A not so senior Ambassador, after less than a month in a new post in a region he has not served in previously, pops up and tells HMG in telegrams circulated far and wide round Whitehall and the British diplomatic network that they have got things seriously Wrong.

I think Craig gets it Wrong.

First, as he must have known well, such a noisy and abrupt opening shot was going to annoy more senior people than it persuaded.

Note: Yes, I know that Craig received many positive emails for these first telegrams, including indeed one from me.

But work which is praised by people with little to lose and/or not working on the problem is not always the same as work which, even if couched in robust terms critical of the current line, is seen by key people at HQ as basically reasonable and constructive.

Second, Craig projects no sense at all of explaining how, given the awfulness of the Uzbekistan regime, he thinks we might make practical if probably painfully incremental progress in changing it, and what HMG might lose if we decide to try that path.

Third, denouncing the Americans' policy in such abusive terms while not explaining that eg our EU partner Germans too are doing their fair share of cosying up to Karimov is monochrome, even banal analysis. Plus it lacks operational credibility - if the Americans do have the main Western weight in Uzbekistan (and have just suffered 9/11) how to woo them in Washington and in Tashkent towards what we might see as a more 'balanced' policy? Is telling them that they're blundering oafs really the way most likely to get the results Craig wants?

Fourth, there seems to be nothing said about Russian ambitions - maybe in the Greater Scheme of Things it is just better that Western governments engage busily with Karimov, hoping slowly to turn that society in a more pluralist direction, than that reactionary post-Soviet instincts emanating from Moscow recover their strength.

Finally, the world does not give us a choice between Good and Bad options. Often there looks to be only a range of Pretty Bad options available, some with longer-term implications than others. Maybe using an oppressive regime in Uzbekistan to hit hard at an even worse regime in Afghanistan is, for now, the Least Bad Option, and so good hard-headed diplomatic business?

In short, Craig throws himself in a tabloidy, unprofessional, unconvincing  way at a hugely complicated international bundle of issues, asserting (in effect) that there is a simple way forward.

Not too surprising that those in the policy chain in London were irritated at Craig's implication that they too were a bunch of duffers missing all the obvious points, and that they quickly started to wonder what they were now dealing with?

Professional Judgement Rating: 2/10.  Makes numerous important points about the dire human rights situation in Uzbekistan, but shows no appreciation of how matters might be taken forward in a way likely to achieve better results on that front as well as on the many other key policy challenges HMG face in the region. Worrying tendency so early in a posting to get carried away with his own naive rhetoric, losing perspective.

A bit more on Karadzic, alas.

Dick Holbrooke says that there was No Deal struck by him with Karadzic under which if Karadzic left political life he would not be sent to the Hague Tribunal.

Karadzic in his first appearance at ICTY tried to get this claim established, but failed. It will return.

Meanwhile Mo Sacirbey (Sacirbegovic), the fomer Bosnia/Izetbegovic Foreign Minister, says that there was a Deal! He cites US diplomat Robert Frowick as the 'unimpeachable' source!

Sacirbey. That name rings a bell..?

Oh yes.

As far as I can tell, his legal campaign in the USA against extradition to Bosnia to face some grave corruption charges is still dragging on.

Surely the point is that even if Holbrooke gave any undertakings to Karadzic to 'go easy' on the ICTY process, they had to be worth little if anything in legal terms.

Once ICTY had issued its indictment on war crimes charges of this importance, it would have to be pursued to the end.

Even if politically and presentationally inconvenient for some people.

These celebrity revivals are sooooo exhausting.

First we have the long-awaited return to the stage of Joker Karadzic, although without his funny costume and disguise he was really not that scary.

And with him returns Batman Holbrooke, the distinguished former American diplomat whose considerable ego and ruthlessness helped bring peace to the Balkans.

Holbrooke grumbles that Karadzic was not arrested once the Bosnian war was over:

In an interview on CNN aired after the court hearing, Mr Holbrooke said: "I negotiated a very tough deal. He had to step down immediately from both his posts as president of the Serb part of Bosnia and as head of his party. And he did so.

"But when he disappeared, he put out a piece of disinformation that I had cut a deal with him - if he disappeared we wouldn't pursue him. That was a completely false statement."

Mr Holbrooke also said it was a grave mistake that Karadzic was not arrested after Nato forces deployed to Bosnia following the peace agreement.

"He should have been arrested. His green Mercedes was parked in its parking spot outside his office for six months after (the peace deal) each day. The Nato commander at the time refused to arrest him even though he had the authority to do so. It was a terrible mistake."

Agreed. A terrible and expensive mistake.

But by whom exactly?

The commander of the NATO Rapid Reaction Force in Bosnia in early 1996 was General Mike Walker (British).

Further up the NATO chain were two Americans, Admiral Leighton Smith as commander of IFOR and at the top of the NATO command chain General George Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).

Holbrooke in another interview blames Admiral Smith by name:

... Karadzic should have been captured in the first few months after [the signing of the] Dayton [Peace Accords], in early 1996. Even though everybody knew where he was, he was not brought to justice because the NATO commander, Adm. Leighton Smith, failed to exercise his authority. Smith said it was not a mission of his command, which was a terrible thing to do. Had Karadzic been arrested back then, the history of the Balkans would have been much easier during the last 13 years ...

Weedy NATO fails again!

Really?

The point of course is that the arrest of Karadzic required a top-level political decision, since the risks of the Dayton deal breaking up if it all went wrong had to be factored in.

Thus:

... the military warned of casualties and Serb retaliation if an operation to arrest him took place. They said they would carry it out only if ordered to do so directly by the President; thus if anything went wrong the blame would fall on the civilians who had insisted on the operation, especially on the President himself.

This was a heavy burden to lay on any President, particularly during an election year, and it was hardly surprising that no action was taken to mount, or even plan, an operation against Karadzic in 1996 or 1997 (sic).

A 'heavy burden'?

Or is taking a tough strategic decision exactly what a President is paid to do?

Who wrote that politically disobliging passage anyway? No fan of the then US President Clinton, obviously!

The Riddler? 

John Redwood aims to correct in brisk fashion some 'Continental Misunderstandings' about a future Conservative Government's policy on further EU integration (and indeed the EU integration we already have).

Eg on the Lisbon Treaty:

“We assume the Conservatives will go along with the European project and with the Lisbon settlement – the UK has always in the past joined in, albeit reluctantly and late.”

It would be unwise to make such an assumption this time. When Margaret Thatcher came to power she did want to complete the Single market, and when Tony Blair came to power he did want to give the EU more powers over social and employment policy. The modern Conservatives have no wish to grant any more power to the EU. Moreover, we have voted against Nice, Amsterdam and Lisbon because we disagree fundamentally with them, and expect powers back. As William Hague has said, we cannot leave matters as they are if Lisbon has been ratified by all countries.

“What can the UK do if Lisbon has not been ratified by all countries?”

An incoming government can keep its pledge to give the people a referendum. If they vote No to Lisbon the government will repeal the legislation and the Treaty is dead.

A UK referendum of this sort would be a cracker of an event. Some Continentals must be wondering nervously what happens if the Irish problem remains 'open' and the Labour Party's agonies here prompt an early UK election.

Otherwise the key point is the proposition that if Lisbon has been ratified (somehow) by the time the Conservatives take over (if they do), "matters cannot be left as they are".

Fine. But what exactly to do?

There is always the famous Lisbon Treaty Article 50 which for the first time makes explicit the option of a member state actually leaving the EU, even if the last word zanily looks to be left with the European Council once the European Parliament has given its 'consent':

1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.

2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.

Heading into that maelstrom is maybe too dramatic a UK move, for the time being.

But as there is no prospect of our EU partners agreeing to 're-open' the Treaty to row back some of it for the UK's benefit, what else is available?

The next best lever for Change We Brits Can Believe In is ... British Money. Not agreeing to pay it into the central pot without radical reforms.

That means the next Financial Perspective negotiations which come round again in 2012 or thereabouts.

180 weeks or so.

Not too long.

The words "modern management techniques" and "whelk stall" come to mind:

Labour was plunged into open warfare as Gordon Brown's allies launched a series of highly personal attacks on leadership rival David Miliband.

Did 'sources at Number 10' and 'Brown's allies' and 'an MP close to Brown' really say stuff like this:

• "If he has not got enough work to do then maybe he needs to be given another job," ... "He [Miliband] needs to calm down and shut up. He also needs to grow up,"  
• Mr Miliband has "one more chance" to "clarify" his position when he appears on radio today. after refusing to rule out challenging Mr Brown four times
• "He [Miliband] has behaved disgracefully and disloyally. People will be surprised that he has chosen to write an article like that at a time when the Prime Minister is under attack after last week's loss.
• "There have never been any real warmth towards David in the Labour party, but people did respect his ability. However, I think he has overreached himself here in a major way."
• "David had the opportunity to close this story down and he didn't take it. I am afraid his ego has clouded his judgement.

Seems they did!

Should they be sacked? Yes!

The dysfunctional operation in Number 10 only adds to the distracting din ... That is not exactly the way of calming a story down. The former minister, Denis MacShane, told me that the briefings were far more damaging than Miliband's article and that whoever made them should be sacked. He is not alone in his concern at the Downing Street operation.

Have I got this straight?

Number 10 are putting it about that the British Foreign Secretary whom the Prime Minister appointed is an immature egoist, lacking in judgement?

That will help the British arguments dominate the room next time Mr Miliband has to meet eg his US or Russian or Chinese opposite numbers to tackle something serious.

The FT attempts to describe how this morass of trade rules complexity has hit the rocks (Note: deliberate mixed metaphor). See also this.

When one has worked in Diplomacy for as long as I have, one realises just how little one knows.

So on this subject I have primitive instincts/prejudices in favour of 'free trade' as opposed to eg 'fair trade'. But if asked to write a succinct and sensible two-page essay on how world trade talks work, I could not do so.

Obviously some of it is about what actually happens, and some of it is about what might happen, and how different 'safety nets' can be used in case of things going 'wrong' (NB not easily defined what that means) on a local level.

Plus a lot depends on the individual power of specific national and international lobbies, with US elections and no doubt many others round the world looming.

And predicting what any deal will mean in practice with oil and food prices in such a state of flux round the world is next to impossible

Thus from the FT:

The US created some momentum last Tuesday by proposing to reduce its allowable ceiling for farm subsidies to $15bn (€9.6bn, £7.5bn). The figure was a couple of billion dollars below Washington’s previous offer and much less than existing limits of $48bn, though – as Brazil and India promptly pointed out – about twice its current actual spending.

It appears from this that the US slashed its farm subsidy safety net in this area from a potential $48bn to a measly $15bn. Pretty generous, huh? But Brazil/India pointed out that in fact the US was spending only some $7bn, so keeping the safety net at double that was suspicious.

See also this:

The US, with covering fire from some developing world agricultural exporters such as Uruguay, insisted that India and China open their rice and cotton markets; India and China, backed by other heavy hitters such as Indonesia, said that the US was asking them to sacrifice too much.

It does not sound from this as if the USA is going to be noisily blamed for this trade round failing. China and India as fast developing economies want to have their rice cakes and eat them - they want maximum freedom to export and maximum options to protect their domestic base. Nothing surprising there, but other developing countries might think that with the success they currently are enjoying they might take a few more 'risks'.

It is all horribly complicated. Business Standard:

The battle to conclude negotiations for Doha in agriculture and market-opening for industrial products broke down due to unbridgeable differences between India and the United States over the trigger and remedy for using the Special Safeguards Mechanism (SSM) by developing countries to check sudden surges in imports of vulnerable farm products.

After 12 days of intense negotiations, Commerce Minister Kamal Nath and his US counterpart US Trade Representative Susan Schwab failed to agree on a figure for using the SSM.

India proposed that if imports cross 115 per cent over a base period, it should be allowed to impose safeguard duties that are 25 to 30 per cent over its bound duties on products taking zero cut.

Uuurgh. How far in all that are they talking about things likely to happen in real life, as opposed to mere potentially destabilising possibilities? How many special interests stand to benefit corruptly round the world from the jungle of local rules needed to make such detailed provisions work?

Finally, the human factor. These articles bring out that the personalities of individual negotiators count for a lot, as does the guile or otherwise of the person leading the process, here WTO DG Pascal Lamy. He gambled that he could close some well known large gaps, and (says the FT) lost.

What next?

All being well that the main players will go off and lick their wounds for a few months without rocking the global trade boat too much in the meantime.

Then try again.

And hope that in the meantime those who lose out from rather less globalisation (ie the very poor) don't perish on a scale and in a way which allows anyone involved in these talks to be blamed.

Peter Preston gives a rather overwritten analysis of Serbia and its prospects for joining the EU - see eg the obscure Paul Anka reference.

Why, he asks, is the EU mumbling about bringing the former Yugoslavia space (plus Albania) into its ranks?

Partly because the EU mumbles about everything.

Partly because countries like France plan to hold EU Widening hostage to get more EU Deepening (but on French terms, bien sur)

Also because there must be a school of thought out there that the former Yugoslavia should have joined nicely in the 1990s and had one vote - is this all an insane plot by the Balkanites to get themselves six or seven votes?

The arrest of Karadzic prompts another thought.

What if Tadic's Serbia has had a Clever Idea? To hand over all those war criminals, dash for EU standards and join the EU as a polite, penitent, respectable modern country. Even now Serbia is probably better run than some new EU member states one can think of. 

Serbia will believe with good reason there is no prospect of Kosovo joining the EU at that speed - its insititutional base is too weak.

And the point is this.

Once Serbia joins the EU it will be able to Define Terms for Kosovo, just as tiny Cyprus defines terms for Turkey.

Discuss.

Back to Craig Murray's Murder in Samarkand - off with his family to Tashkent (Chapter 3).

Uzbekistan was one of the fifteen Soviet republics to become independent in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed. Craig offers a few paragraphs on the history of 'Uzbek independence', without saying anything about what makes Uzbeks a distinct community in that complicated part of the world. He has one excellent line about the ruling elite there:

... But they left the USSR in order to keep the Soviet system, not to destroy it.

Craig complains that "short-sighted US Republicans" have confused Uzbek leader Karimov with the pro-democracy heroes of Central Europe (Walesa, Havel). 

Cliche Alert (1): US Republicans = Bad.

Hmm. Short-sighted US Democrats made the same mistake.

Arriving in the middle of the night the Murray family are met by Embassy colleagues Karen Moran and her partner Chris Hurst. Karen is one of few women featuring in the book (another is Mrs Murray) without a vivid description.

The Murrays drive into Tashkent, proud to see the Ambassadorial flag flying on the Embassy car. A minor diplomatic solecism? Usually this is not appropriate until a new Ambassador has presented credentials.

The next day he explores for the first time the poorly laid-out Embassy offices and gives the staff an opening pep talk:

I wanted the embassy to make a positive difference to Uzbekistan ... to influence the policy of the government of Uzbekistan, the policy back in London and the policy of international institutions, in such a way that the lives of people in Uzbekistan would be discernibly better for our work.

This (to me) strikes an odd note. Is Craig's Main Effort as a British Ambassador to improve the lives of people in Uzbekistan, or the lives of people in the UK? Is not his job to implement London policy, not 'influence' it for the benefit of Uzbeks?

That aside, Craig gets off to what reads like a strong start, visiting local British businesses in their offices (not done by his predecessors) and resolving to do a lot more driving round the country to see for himself what is happening (Note: in principle a sound plan, but time-consuming and tiring - how will the small underpowered Embassy shop run itself during these prolonged absences?)

The Murrays are invited to Uzbekistan Independence Day celebrations, a sprawling noisy affair. They are told to be ready in their seats at 1730, but the show does not start until the President arrives at 1930.

Craig is 'livid' at being kept waiting. The next day he sends a formal diplomatic note to the Uzbekistan Foreign Ministry pointing out their 'gross discourtesy' in expecting Ambassadors to be seated some two hours before the event started. He copies this missive to all other Embassies in Tashkent:

This caused a sensation ... Diplomats in general being wimpish, none of my colleagues had ever raised a whimper before. For exhibiting the remotest trace of a backbone, I was viewed as fantastically daring and backslapped by the entire diplomatic community.

Cliche Alert (2): Wimpish diplomats.

Another oddity. In formal protocol/professional terms, putting in a Note of the sort Craig describes and copying it round the Diplomatic Corps is completely out of order when he has not yet presented his credentials.

You might say that the vile Uzbekistan regime do not merit much if anything by way of protocol niceties. And you might well be right.

Yet ... is this Wise?

Your job as Ambassador is not to win cheap points with your diplomatic colleagues, wimpish or otherwise. Your job is to advance British interests, which means (in a place like this) carefully taking stock and seeing how best to work the local system, odious as it might be, to the UK's overall advantage.

I would have done it differently, writing a personal letter to the Head of Uzbekistan Protocol (cc the Foreign Minister's and President's respective offices), expressing my private disappointment at the protocol arrangements at the fascinating and spectacular Independence Day events, and suggesting that improvements could be made which I was sure other Ambassadorial colleagues would value.

That sort of deft letter catches their attention at a high level, but does not cause too much open embarrassment/annoyance.

The problem with Craig's much more public, 'in their face' protest is that it achieves Impact, but perhaps at too high a cost.

The tough Uzbeks will be impressed by the fact that a new, forceful British Ambassador has hit town. But what conclusion will they draw?

That he needs to be taken seriously, as a sign that the Brits are changing their whole approach towards Uzbekistan? Or rather that he is a patronising, showy-off lightweight?

Professional Judgement Rating: 6/10.  Lively positive new engagement with UK business community and energetic 'new broom' sense with Embassy staff. But to get best results needs to watch his dealings with local officials (even when his concerns are justified) and not give the impression that he seeks the limelight at the expense of being effective.

When Milosevic was abruptly transferred to the Hague Tribunal in June 2001 I dusted off my barristerial wig and sent a lively telegram to London from Belgrade on the theme "Is Milosevic Innocent?".

My point was that linking Milosevic to the calamitous events in Bosnia and other non-Serbia parts of former Yugoslavia in a way capable of withstanding rigorous legal scrutiny would not be easy.

There probably would not be clear documentary or other physical proof linking him as a Serbia leader directly to proven atrocities in Bosnia/Croatia. 

So to convict him at ICTY it would have to be proved beyond doubt that in some less explicit way he was 'responsible' for them - maybe he ordered lesser actions which, given the obvious circumstances, had to lead to such atrocities elsewhere, or at least he did not do all he might have done to stop them.

Could be ... Tricky. 

Thus was it likely that Milosevic was directly responsible for the horrendous Srebrenica massacre? On the face of it, no - why would he have wanted something like this to happen when he knew it would provoke a huge international outcry against the Serb cause generally?

Will Karadzic's guilt be easier to establish?

Probably yes.

Or not. 

He (unlike Milosevic) was (a) an openly influential figure in Bosnian Serb ranks and (b) actually in Bosnia as the conflict raged, meeting the media and genially denying any wrong doing.

His operational responsibility over the Bosnian Serb forces was self-evidently higher, as was his operational leadership capacity to influence political events for the better - hence also higher his legal/moral responsibility for horrors occurring when (and because?) he did not do so.

That said, for those very reasons of proximity he can (unlike Milosevic) attempt at his trial to drum up all sorts of arguments that for every given Bosnian Serb alleged war-crime he was acting closely in one way or the other with the 'international community' on the ground, in its various bungled efforts to bring peace to Bosnia.

And (unlike Milosevic) he can point in detail to Bosniac/Muslim and Croat military and political decisions which (he might say) forced the Serbs into justifiable self-defence measures.

Or he might dwell on the strange ways in which heavy weaponry found its way to the Bosniacs/Muslims during the conflict despite an international arms embargo, with various Western powers not exactly doing much to stop this.

He might force the Tribunal to look hard at the political and moral events leading to the outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia, where the Izetbegovic Muslim tendency arguably played a highly irresponsible role. If someone else recklessly starts a fire, is your legal responsibility somehow diminished if you behave badly in the ensuing panic?

And/or he could try to claim - and be able to show - that at different points senior international negotiators made him promises or otherwise deliberately and knowingly influenced his calculations in a way which is now highly embarrassing in some circles. 

In short, he has lots of options for creating a circus, with all this grimly complex history being pored over for years in excruciating detail. There will be no shortage of money for top-end legal defence teams, if he wants them. 

Or is there another option - that he is just worn out by it all, and plans quietly to plead guilty to all charges?

Somehow I doubt it. 

Do we bring up our children to take seriously the difference between right and wrong?

We think we do. Not much sign that it is working.

One way to catch their attention is to lay out clearly to them that Bad Behaviour has Bad Consequences. That if they do not take responsibility for the results of what they do, they may well be harshly punished.

This alas is not really a lesson for Western life today, as much bad behaviour these days obviously has quite good consequences for the person responsible for it.

In part this is because of Leftist/PoMo deconstruction of the idea of Right and Wrong as some sort of artifice created by Mostly Dead White men to oppress the planet. The 'root causes' of obnoxious behaviour are given pride of place in the dominant analysis of most social problems, diminishing the very idea of personal responsibility.

Ditto at the international level. There is a profound reluctance to confront regimes who fail to meet even the most basic standards. We're not judgemental! 

See the howls of rage against President Bush for having (as Mr Prout might say) the temerity, the affrontery, the audacity, to topple Saddam Hussein. Who does he think he is, imposing his nasty cowboy values on everyone else?

Some parts of the world do not take part in the Western trivialisation of values. Here children learn that if they do something Bad, something Very Bad will happen.

I wonder where the petty theft rate by youngsters is lower?  

My earlier posting on Craig Murray's telegram to the FCO recording serious human rights abuses in Uzbekistan dismissed the response he won from HQ, namely that the UK would press for an 'EU demarche'.

Why? It sounds grand and important.

Not an easy question to answer simply.

What is a 'demarche'? In this context a formal representation of protest/concern agreed and issued by the EU member states as a whole, and delivered on behalf of the EU to a host government by a small group of Ambassadors.

Who they are depends on who is around. Thus it might be that the country representing the EU Presidency has no bilateral Embassy in the country in question, so another Ambassador will be representing the Presidency locally and take the lead. S/he might be accompanied by the Ambassador representing the country taking over the forthcoming Presidency and eg an official from the Commission.

I never liked being part of these 'group' demarches and (bad boy) turned a Nelsonian Blind Eye to any instructions to do so. It always struck me as arrogant and patronising - and therefore likely to be less effective - that a group of Ambassadors appear to gang up on a host governmentto to deliver a formal protest.  Much better to attack the target in coordinated parallel bilateral sessions, with each Embassy delivering the message in the way most calculated to have Impact.

Plus, to be frank, I never liked airing my dark diplomatic arts in front of other non-British colleagues. What if during the meeting a private hint emerged of a way of moving forward which needed some frank discussion? Harder to do that in an EU group without straying from 'instructions' or risking exposing EU divisions and risking a silly row. 

EU demarches are therefore true 'lowest common denominator' diplomacy.

In this case the UK probably will have put round a telegram called a COREU to all EU member states' Foreign Ministries summarising the Murray report, and proposing the text of a demarche.

There then may well have followed a painful round of Euro-teeth-sucking and drafting quibbling, of the form:

"The Foreign Ministry of Moronia thanks the UK for its draft Demarche on this undoubtedly important subject, but wonders whether more investigation of the case in question is needed before the European Union commits itself to the proposed course of action...Given the lack of clarity about the facts of this one case, perhaps the language in paragraph 6(b) needs to be rather less direct? May we propose instead ..." 

Because consensus is needed, the draft in successive rounds of wittering tends to get diluted to suit the weediest concerns.

And, of course, if by any chance the foreign Minister of Moronia is meeting the Uzbekistan Minister in the coming weeks, Moronia may well not choose to open a row beforehand by sending in its Ambassador for a demarche of this sort.

Bottom Line: slow, bad outcomes. No real impact expected.

As Craig reports later in the book, the French Ambassador delivered the eventual demarche accompanied by Craig and two other EU colleagues "in a tour de force of Gallic insouciance", giving every impression that the exercise was purely formal and of little substance. When Craig then pointed out that in Uzbekistan 99% of trials ended in conviction and so were probably not fair, the Uzbek Foreign Minister smirked "Under our system only the guilty are accused."

In other words, this way of doing diplomatic business did not strengthen the weight of the protest, as the EU liked to think. It obviously diminished it.

What's more, the process of lurching the EU machine into movement for hollow exercises of this nature is time-consuming and distracting.

Which, worst of all, creates in the FCO official mind a sort of pre-emptive dumbed-down British punch-pulling - "if we can not get the support of EU partners without a lot of hard work or at all, why bother?"

Is there any better way to proceed?

Alas not obviously in this case. The Uzbeks were too far away, too obnoxious and too impervious to normal diplomatic pressure. Engaging our efforts with the Americans rather than the EU might have been better. But as we shall see, Craig quickly fell out with the US Ambassador and whatever chances there might of been of using that approach dwindled away.

Why not press for a personal letter to be sent from our Foreign Minister to his.her Uzbek oppo, to express in frank terms strong British dismay at this example of Uzbek injustice?

But here too one is Nutted by Reality. A private letter makes more impact on the target Minister, but because it is private it is easier to ignore. Publishing the letter turns up the public rhetorical pressure but allows the target and local media to dismiss the whole protest as tired/toothless/'arrogant' British post-imperial nagging.

And in the Uzbek system the Foreign Minister is probably a suave front-man with no power anyway. Even if he too is revolted by the Uzbek courts, what in practice can he do? Does he want to risk his nice job and perks for the sake of someone he has never met and who he suspects (rightly) of wanting to bring about radical changes including the ejection from office and possible trial of himself?

Er ... no.

When all the diplomatic flim-flam is stripped away, it all boils down to some very fundamental propositions:

• Can we persuade them to behave better on Human Rights merits?
• If not, can we plus/minus others create a different cost/benefit calculation for them to mull over - either more Gain or more Pain, or combination thereof?
• And is the effort required to make a difference in Hell-Hole (A) really worth it? Better to throw our available Human Rights time and energy at places such as Hell-Holes (B) and (C) which for one reason or the other currently look more receptive and where we have more levers to pull?

Tough, huh?

Welcome to Diplomacy.

Moving on to the substance of Craig Murray's book.

Chapter One opens with a description of Craig leaving the Embassy in Samarkand (seemingly early in his posting) to attend a dissident trial.

...out I went, still feeling pretty uncomfortable at people calling me 'Sir'...

Part of Craig's self-presentation lies in in portraying himself as Mr Unconventional Unstuffy Ambassador, eschewing boring old protocol in favour of Action. This sits uneasily with other passages in the book where he expresses indignation at the poor treatment handed out to him as Ambassador by the Uzbeks:

... I had accepted an invitation to a dinner to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the state tractor factory. (Note: they know how to throw a party in Uzkebistan) All the Ambassadors were invited but I was the only own to turn up apart from the Belgian Honorary Consul. We were completely ignored and left to find our own place at the bottom of the table. I learnt that the rudeness shown to diplomats at Independence Day was typical...

Invited to a concert at Tashkent Conservatoire:

I was the only Ambassador to turn up. There was nothing prepared for me, and I was left to find a place in a concert hall that was overfull.

Had Craig's office telephoned to confirm and nail down satisfactory protocol arrangements? What I would have asked to be done, if only because then one is on firmer grounds to complain afterwards if there is a mess.

Craig meets relatives of some of the unlucky people on trial, including the beautiful Dilobar:

Her brother was going to be executed and I was trying to make out her legs through her dress. I was filled with self-loathing.

Not for long:

My momentary self-hatred turned to real anger against a system that promotes torture and execution, as well as against fellow diplomats for their complacent acquiescence.

After having 'snapped' against a paramilitary who held him back, grabbing him by the throat(!?) and raging "Don't you touch me!", Craig enters the shabby courtroom.

A superb description by Craig of the seedy, immoral farce which ensues, operating under the communist principle that 'the prisoner in the dock has to be guilty, otherwise why would he be in the dock?'

The nasty judge makes no pretence at honesty and justice, summarily and obnoxiously dismissing all defence witness points including claims of torture. Very bad.

Craig leaves, rightly (seems to me) shaken by this experience. He resolves:

... to dedicate every fibre of my being to stopping this horror in Uzbekistan ... I would not go along with lies or leave the truth unspoken ... If these were our allies in the War on Terror, we were not on the clear moral ground which Blair and Bush (sic) claimed so boastfully.

The grim episode is reported to London, with the result that it is agreed that the UK call for an EU demarche by way of formal protest.

Craig does not comment on this useless outcome. If anything is less likely to make an impact in a place like Uzbekistan it is an EU demarche. Why did he and the Human Rights team in London go for this banal approach?

Was there really nothing else in our diplomatic armoury which might have had a sharper, deeper impact? A Ministerial letter? Instructions to weigh in with the Uzbeks at a high level? Balance of taking action privately as opposed to publicly? How to engage the Americans? Consideration by Craig on how best to Make an Impact, both immediately and over the time of his posting?

Not explained, one way or the other. A pity.

Craig does fairly analyse the difficulty even with plausible sounding dissidents of getting to the bottom of what was going on and why. There were rebel groups of different varieties out there working hard and maybe even violently against the Uzbek regime. Maybe some of those on trial had been involved in illegal activities, even if their trials were manifestly unjust? Not easy for diplomats to decide how best to proceed. Well put.

The chapter ends with Craig seeing unspeakable photgraphs of a dead Islamic dissident - subsequent analysis indicates that he had been killed by immersion in boiling water after earlier torture.

Professional Judgement Rating: 8/10. Powerful and unprecedented first-hand senior intervention at one of these trials in Uzbekistan, reported speedily to London. Not clear why the London/Post operational outcome looks so weak. Signs of excessive and inappropriate confrontation/frustration with the locals, plus an intemperate attitude to colleagues: diplomats who disagree with him are not necessarily 'complacent'.

A reader not unreasonably draws attention to a link in my previous post to a fascinating original FCO document reporting a conversation with Craig Murray.

He  wonders whether diplomats who 'temper' their reporting themselves create the impression that others who report more passionately are the only FCO people with a conscience.

In other words, those dwelling in the Land of the Mute and Timid should not condemn as unnecessarily/improperly noisy a rare someone who speaks clearly.

Interesting. Not a point I had thought about in this immediate context - as an ex-FCO insider who knows Simon Butt (we joined on the same day back in 1979) but not Craig Murray, I read Butt's minute with a very different eye.

The professional point raised is in fact subtle. Here goes.

Officials are paid to report and to offer their analysis and judgement.

Officials' views and judgements sent in to HMG from far-flung posts may not coincide with those of their official colleagues at HQ, or more importantly with those of elected Ministers.

Quite right too.

Those in HQ tend to lack the feel for what is happening in other countries, and what that might mean for future developments. But they know a lot about what is in the public eye in the UK. And the public pay everyone's wages. 

In turn someone who pores day and night over the intricate goings-on in Uzbekistan (or Poland or Serbia or Paraguay) knows a heck of lot about all that, but maybe risks losing a sense of where that country fits into the great scheme of the foreign policy aims which the British Government of the day are pursuing.

So a dynamic synthesis emerges.

A skilful diplomat overseas manages (a) to keep HQ alert to the implications of local developments where s/he is posted, and (b) is consistently persuasive on what (if anything) we should be doing by way of response.

And good officials back home need to keep an open mind - part of their job too is to warn Ministers of troubles perhaps to come.

Achieving that synthesis intelligently in practice depends on a lot of factors, not least personalites which come and go, as well as other Big Issues at the time.

Plus the hard fact is that for British Ministers some places are just more important than others. 

Greeks and Turks in many constituencies have some votes, and are voluble on the subject of Cyprus. The Uzbek community in the UK (if one even exists) has no such profile or weight.

So wooing Ministers and the system away from immediate problems causing them operational grief now to spend time on likely problems some way down the road is a struggle to be waged with guile, patience and insight. Maybe, above all, with good networked teamwork.

In short, when good diplomats 'temper' their work it is not because they are spineless or unambitious, although perhaps some can be.

It is in part because they know that it is not enough to be Right - in a democratic system where so many clever and urgent ideas buzz about, you have also to be Effective and Convincing. 

And that if you strive too hard to show that your insights are uniquely important, you may just overdo the adverbs and rhetoric and lose your HQ audience.

A bit like a noisy belligerent orator at Speakers Corner - fleetingly amusing with some good points, but if the tone and content do not vary the crowd drift away.

So read the excellent FCO documents on Craig's site with all that in mind.

If you had any thoughts about how he and the FCO fell out so spectacularly and what it all meant, do you find your mind changing a bit - one way or the other? 

Nelson Mandela was finally released from prison to global acclaim on 11 February 1990.

Despite being First Secretary (Political) at our Embassy in Cape Town at the time, I missed it. My friend and colleague John (now Sir John) Sawers was there in the thick of the action, and was probably the first British person to greet Mandela in person after all those long years of imprisonment. Which diplomatic and personal nimbleness he is now deploying to good effect as HM Ambassador at the United Nations.

Anyway, I missed this historic moment because I was in deepest Transkei, Mandela's Xhosa home base, at a rally of the ANC's rival the Pan Africanist Congress.

This was a daunting affair, a heaving African crowd crammed into a sweaty hall chanting 'one settler, one bullet'. Mine was the only pink and conspicuously settlerish face for many miles in any direction.

The ANC (with its steely core of Moscow communist discipline) went on to sweep the board in ensuing elections in South Africa, and the PAC disintegrated in the margins.   

Anyway, a few months later the Embassy had relocated to Pretoria for the non-Parliamentary season. The Ambassador was in the UK. His deputy set up a call on Mandela in Soweto and drove off, delighted with his likely 'scoop'. I was left to run the ship on a sleepy afternoon. 

Zzzzz. 

The telephone rings. The security guard at the gate. "Nelson Mandela is here!"

Panic.

I race downstairs to greet Mandela and escort him to the Ambassador's office. His people mutter something unconvincing (and it turned out untrue) about having called us to say that the meeting with the Deputy Head of Mission was to be here, not in Soweto. Urgent calls go out to try to get my boss back to the Embassy asap for the meeting.

So we sat and waited. I, lowly First Sec Pretoria, a very small ant crawling on the vast dunghill of world history, had the most famous person in the world and a couple of his people, all to myself!

We talked mainly about the ghastly violence in KwaZulu, where ANC/SACP members and Inkatha supporters of Zulu leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi were killing each other in large numbers.

At one point Mandela sharply said "Would you people support Buthelezi as President?"

I replied, "If he wins a free and fair election of all South Africans, why not?"

There was a long awkward silence.

Then one of Mandela's people spoke through gritted teeth: "Good answer!"

Eventually Mandela decided not to wait for my boss to return from Soweto and departed, the 'white' South African local staff women in the Embassy jostling to meet him and being charmed to bits.

And to make an exciting day complete, my boss finally arrived. Too late to meet Mandela but complete with speeding ticket. By then I had drafted my telegram to London recording my fascinating encounter. 

Bliss.

This sorry Swedish story attracted fleeting global attention.

A school in Sweden confiscated a boy's party invitations being handed out to his friends as two classmates were not invited:

"Two people in class had not been invited, and that is not allowed. The ones who were not invited felt sad and l